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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

International Factors in Revolution:

The Cold War Bipolar Actors at the System Level and
the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in History

by

Debbie Dokhi Bibiyan

2001

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
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
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University of California, Los Angeles
2001

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For My Father, MANOUCHEHR BIBIYAN

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Acknowledgments

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the committee members of this dissertation. I would like to thank my adviser, Professor Leonard Binder of the Political Science department, who since the beginning of my graduate studies has guided my development as a scholar. His vast knowledge is admirable. He was generous with his time, and provided significant advice throughout my graduate studies. He prepared me for a field for my doctoral oral exams. He critiqued the drafts of this dissertation, and provided critical and significant comments and recommendations at all the stages of the dissertation. It has been an honor to learn from him.

I also want to thank other members of my committee from the History Department. I want to thank Professor Stanford Shaw for introducing me to the Modern History of the Middle East as an undergraduate, for chairing my doctoral exams, and for his significant recommendations on this dissertation.

I thank Professor Michael Morony, for his critique and suggestions on the drafts of the dissertation. I also thank Professor Gabriel Piterberg for reading and commenting on this dissertation.

I would also like to thank my parents. I am grateful to my father, Mr. Manouchehr Bibiyan, for his permanent support. Through his profession as an independent journalist in America, the producer and director of JAAM-E-JAM Television, he introduced me to the Iranian opposition leaders abroad; several former Iranian Prime Ministers and several former Iranian cabinet ministers of the old regime which enabled me to have discussions with these statesmen and become informed of the modern history of Iran. I am also grateful to my mother for her encouragement.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

International Factors in Revolution:

The Cold War Bipolar Actors at the System Level and
the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979

by

Debbie Dokhi Bibiyan

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Los Angeles, 2001

Professor Leonard Binder, Co-Chair
Professor Michael Morony, Co-Chair

The problem analyzed in this dissertation is whether international factors

were contributory causal factors in the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979.

Three theoretical frameworks were selected to explore this problem:

theories of revolution, theories of international relations and theories of intervention. The units of analysis are the state and the international system. Declassified documents were examined. Interviews with the ruling political elite of the old regime and other statements were consulted and conducted to gain the perspective and insight of the pre-revolutionary state of the Shah's regime.

The Iranian Revolution is shown to be an integral part of the Cold War international system and the Regional Middle East system. International factors are shown to be a complement to domestic factors. Both Cold War polar actors at the system level—the United States and the Soviet Union—were found to have been causal factors in the revolution.

The causes of the Iranian Revolution were shown to have been international factors, domestic factors, and a responsive state—domestically and internationally.

Chapter 1
Introduction

This dissertation analyzes the international causes of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979. It is argued here that international influences , more specifically, the Cold War bipolar actors at the system level, were contributory factors in the causes of the revolution, and that the Iranian Revolution was an integral part of the Cold War system and the Regional Middle East system. Despite the proliferation of studies on the Iranian Revolution, most accounts of the Iranian Revolution discount the international dimension, and part of the reason is that theories of revolution also discount international intervention in revolution.[1] The present study intends to redress this shortcoming through an analysis of the impact of the Cold War bipolar actors in the Iranian Revolution.

Conspiracy theories regarding the Iranian Revolution believed by many Iranians and non-Iranians have impeded the study of international factors in the Iranian Revolution. It is argued here that there were strong internal forces, possibly even decisive internal forces, but that there were also external forces. But the extremism associated with the conspiracy

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[1] The exceptions are works which cite the impact of the Carter Administration's Human Rights policy on the Iranian Revolution. Refer to Chapter Four for a discussion of this literature.

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theory has impeded the scholarly study of the external influences on the revolutionary process.

The Problem

This study is proposed to investigate the causes of the Iranian revolution. It will examine international factors in the revolution. The units of analysis in this dissertation are the pre-revolutionary state and the international system.

The problem to be investigated here is: did international influences—the Cold War bipolar actors—contribute to the occurrence of the revolution in Iran?

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are proposed regarding the causes of the Iranian Revolution and the relationship between the domestic variables and the international variables :

- Revolutions have domestic and international causes.
- A pre-revolutionary state which is responsive to domestic pressures and international influences contributes to the success of revolution.
- The causes of the Iranian Revolution are domestic factors, international influences, and a responsive state.

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The Argument

Most accounts of the Iranian Revolution discount the international dimension, and part of the reason is that theories of revolution also discount foreign intervention in revolution.

There is an extensive body of literature on the domestic causes of the Iranian Revolution. Some scholars have advanced theories based on domestic factors in the old regime, some have applied theories of revolution to the Iranian Revolution, and others have written about various economic, social, cultural, and religious (Islamic) crises in various phases of the modern history of Iran. Each of these sources have illuminated aspect/s of the revolution.

The most prevalent arguments as to the causes of the revolution have been analyzed by another scholar. Henry Munson, Jr. has written a book in which he analyzes the validity of these arguments based on a comparative study of Islamic states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. He has classified the arguments under eight categories: 1) Disruptive Effects of Modernization: Rapid Economic Growth, 2) Disruptive Effects of Modernization: Rural-Urban Migration, 3) Disruptive Effects of Modernization: Education, 4) Disruptive Effects of Modernization: The Demand for Political Participation, 5) The Self-Interest of Traditional Social Groups: The Ulama and the Bazaaris, 6)

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Economic Growth and Frustrated Expectations, 7) Cultural Authenticity and Nativism, and 8) Iranian Resentment of American Domination.[2]

Munson rejects these arguments on the basis that these conditions existed in other third world countries including the Islamic Middle East without engendering a revolution. He proposes several other domestic causes, and concludes that despite the existence of the above-mentioned situations in Iran, the revolution did not occur prior to 1978. The reason for the occurrence of the revolution at that time, he states, was that the most precipitating cause of the Iranian Revolution was the Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy. The Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy was a factor in the revolution. It will be argued here that the domestic factors were significant causes of the revolution, but that there were also external factors in the revolution. Regarding the Carter Administration, as discussed in Chapter Four, studies citing the Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy discuss the Shah's perception and psychology and of Iranians. It is argued here that this is a relevant factor, but another pertinent factor is international relations, and in this particular case, the bilateral relations of Iran and the United States.

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[2] Henry Munson, Jr. Islam and Revolution in the Middle East (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 107-124.

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The argument here is that both domestic and international factors in the Iranian Revolution were significant causes of the revolution. The Iranian Revolution was brought about by both domestic and international factors.

In the case study of the Iranian Revolution, the argument of this dissertation is that the causes of the Iranian Revolution are: 1) international factors, 2) domestic factors (e.g. lack of political development), and 3) a responsive state (domestically and internationally).

International Factors

International factors in revolution may include state actors and non-state actors. The former requires an analysis of the international state system. The latter requires an analysis of the international system. Extant theories of revolution which consider both exogenous and endogenous factors in revolution have contributed to our understanding of revolution. The international system: military competition and imperialism, uneven economic development, international crises in part causing the breakdown of states and state breakdown preceding revolutionary movements (Skocpol), lack of support by a superpower in the process of revolution and international intervention as deepening or furthering the revolutionary process (Goldfrank), unequal political status

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and economic development (Bailey), the political-psychology aspect of the decision-making process of superpowers in responding to revolutions (Cottam), the political system of the incumbent state as a vulnerability which is exacerbated by U.S. policy (Goldstone), and transnational ideology and examples, and exogenous assistance or "input" into the growth of revolutionary movements (Halliday) are causal factors in revolution.[3]

Domestic Factors

Theories of revolution which emphasize domestic factors theorize about domestic factors which cause revolutions: repressed instincts (Sorokin)[4], social disequilibrium (Johnson)[5], rising expectations in tolerable but declining socio-economic circumstances (Davies)[6], and relative deprivation and the organizational superiority of the

[3] Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Walter L. Goldfrank, "Theories of Revolution and Revolution Without Theory: The Case of Mexico", Theory and Society, Volume 7, Nos. 1 and 2, January-March 1979. The citation and excerpts of this article are in Jack A. Goldstone, Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1994); Jack A. Goldstone, "Revolution in Modern Dictatorships", Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1994). For a detailed analysis of these and other theories of revolution refer to Chapter Two.
[4] Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Sociology of Revolution (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1925).
[5] Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Second Edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
[6] James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution" in American Sociological Review, Volume 27, Number 1, February 1962.

revolutionaries including the revolutionizing of the neutral populace (Gurr)[7].

Domestic factors including the capabilities of the domestic forces are significant. These factors may not be sufficient causes of revolution. They may not independently cause revolution. In the case study of the Iranian Revolution, it will be argued here that domestic factors and international factors were both significant. The lack of political development and the lack of freedom of the press in the old regime in Iran were significant domestic factors of the revolution.

State Responsiveness

Endogenous theories of revolution have accounted for the causes of revolution as having Elite Response as a variable. Pitirim Sorokin's theory indicates that elite response is a determinative factor in revolution: increasing repression will result in revolution, and decreasing repression contributes to the failure of a revolution.[8] Chalmers Johnson's theory holds that "Elite Intransigence" (defined as the implementation of policies which are reactionary in that they exacerbate the social disequilibrium) contribute to the success of revolution, while

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[7] Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
[8] A.S. Cohan, Theories of Revolution: An Introduction. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), p.193.

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"conservative change" contributes to the "resynchronization" of the social system without the occurrence of a revolution.

Sorokin and Johnson analyze elite response to domestic situations. Elite response may be generalized as the pre-revolutionary state's response. It can be argued that the state's response is not limited to the domestic environment, but rather includes the state's response to the international environment. A pre-revolutionary state may be responsive to both domestic and international pressures. In the Iranian Revolution, the Shah's regime's response to international influences was a significant factor in the causes of the revolution. One area where the state response was significant was the response of the Shah's regime to international concerns regarding human rights in Iran. The old regime in Iran was responsive not only to the domestic forces but also to international influences. One such responsive measure was the implementation of the Policy of Liberalization, which was implemented in response to international human rights concerns such as the Carter Administration, and Non-Governmental Organizations such as Amnesty International.

Theoretical Framework

This dissertation is about international factors in revolution, more specifically about international factors in the Iranian Revolution. The theoretical frameworks which have been selected for this analysis are

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theories of international relations and theories of revolution. Although most of the literature in international relations theory does not directly relate to the causes of revolution, the theories of international relations and doctrines of international law, as discussed in Chapter Three, may be applicable to the study of the causes of revolution. The main theories, concepts and doctrines are the following: polarity, alliances, anarchy, intervention, sovereignty, and domestic jurisdiction, relating to both the international system and the Middle East subsystem.

Theories of revolution from various disciplines are the central theoretical framework. The contribution and the shortcomings of the theories of revolution are discussed in Chapter Two. An integration of theories of international relations into the field of theories of revolution is proposed in the concluding chapter.

Research Method

The case study of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 was selected to determine whether international factors were contributory causes of the revolution. Three theoretical frameworks were selected to explore this problem: theories of revolution, theories of international relations and theories of intervention. The units of analysis are the state and the international system. Declassified documents were examined. Interviews with the ruling political elite of the old regime and other

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statements and figures were consulted and conducted to gain the perspective and insight of the pre-revolutionary state.

Literature/ Sources:

The secondary sources primarily consist of 1) Theories of International Relations, 2) Theories of International Intervention and 3) Theories of Revolution. Extant Theories of Revolution predominantly refer to a number of concepts and paradigms in international relations and have not generally analyzed and applied international relations theory as it relates to the causes of revolution.

The primary sources consist of three types having a unified purpose for this selection. One level of analysis in this dissertation is the state, the Shah's regime. To understand the Iranian Revolution, we have to know how the state saw the revolutionary crises, why it adopted certain policies, and what the ruling political elite of the old regime believe to have been the causes of the Iranian Revolution. This focus on the state is a necessary level of analysis, not solely because of its domestic context, but also in its international context.

The three sources are as follows: 1) sources written by the players in the revolution. The Shah's books have been excluded with good reason. His last book, entitled <u>Answer to History</u>, was published by several different presses. Each book has a different version and a

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different interpretation of the history and politics of Iran including the Iranian Revolution. The first version, the French version, is entitled Reponse a l'Histoire.[9] There is another version, in English, entitled Answer to History, published in the United States. On the copyright page, there is the following statement: "It is my intention that the American version of Answer to History be the definitive text."[10] There is another version also in the English language entitled The Shah's Story.[11] This was published in England. There are also Persian versions entitled Pasukh bi Tarikh (Answer to History), published outside Iran (in the United States and Europe) all with different interpretations.[12] All of these sources, which are supposed to be the autobiography of the Shah, are contradictory and unreliable. Nevertheless, scholars have cited and continue to cite these sources without knowing that their reliability is questionable.

2) JAAM-E-JAM Television's (USA) interviews with Iranian political leaders and Cabinet Ministers of the Shah's regime as well as international political figures such as ambassadors who played a key role in the revolution, in a weekly program entitled Tribune Azad (The Open

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[9] Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Reponse a l'Histoire (Paris: A. Michel, 1979).
[10] Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 1980).
[11] Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The Shah's Story, Teresa Waugh, trans. (London: Michael Joseph, 1980).
[12] Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Pasukh bi Tarikh (Answer to History), unknown publisher and date of publication.

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Forum). [13] The interviews have been conducted in the United States, Europe, and Israel since 1981.

3) I have also conducted interviews with Iranian cabinet members in the Shah's regime and other political figures to further clarify issues.

Transliteration

The transliteration follows the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). Foreign words in the text are underlined.

Delimitations/Limitations

Revolutions have causes, processes and consequences. This dissertation examines the causes of revolution. Revolutions have been classified into revolutions from below and revolutions from above. Other types of regime changes such as coups d'etat have also been called revolutions. This dissertation analyses what in the literature on revolution has been called revolution from below. This also applies to the

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[13] JAAM-E-JAM Television has been broadcasting in America since August 1981. It is produced by Manouchehr Bibiyan. Recently, the Islamic Republic of Iran is using the same name in its television broadcasts in Iran and satellite television programs. There is no connection between the two.

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discussion of theories of revolution, which is limited to the causes of revolution from below.

The domestic factors including domestic forces and their capabilities such as collective action against the Shah's regime were significant, and have been analyzed by other scholars. This dissertation analyzes these factors only as they relate to international factors.

My limitations concern the lack of evidence on other international factors in the Iranian Revolution. It has been more than two decades since the Iranian Revolution, nevertheless, in historical terms, this is a brief period and there are many unanswered questions regarding other international influences. The declassified documents regarding the Iranian Revolution are limited. Therefore, in addition to my limitations, my application of theories of international relations is limited to the actions and interactions of limited international influences vis-à-vis the old regime and the revolutionaries.

Significance of the Study

When Brinton wrote his second edition of <u>Anatomy of Revolution,</u> he told us that the more distant the revolution, the cooler the debate becomes, and that the more is written about modern revolutions, the more detached the analysis becomes:

> For the English, American, and even for the French revolution, the body of reputable and reasonably detached historical writing is

very large indeed. Passions still run high over the French Revolution, but they are being cooled slowly in an increasing flood of printer's ink...The Russian Revolution is perhaps too near us to be regarded by professional historians as capable of the kind of treatment the guild likes to give. Its source material is scattered about, and much of it is withheld from scholars...Yet our supply of facts about the Russian Revolution is by no means so slight, or so poor in quality, as to hinder our enterprise hopelessly. Half a century is a long time, and the early stages of the Russian Revolution have been surveyed, if not *sine ira et studio*, at least with relative detachment. And then both lovers and haters of the present regime in Russia are almost equally articulate, and can be balanced off one against the other by anyone who cares to take the trouble.[14]

The Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 has sparked heated debate analogous to the French Revolution. It is not as old as the Russian Revolution, but twenty-three years is a long time. The continuing "flood of printer's ink", the gradual declassification of Cold War documents, and a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approach to the study of revolution will help us in examining the causes of the revolution. This dissertation is a step in reaching that goal.

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[14] Crane Brinton, <u>The Anatomy of Revolution</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p.14.

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Figure 1.   The International Dimension of the Iranian Revolution

International System

External Factors

V

Intervention

↓

State
Responsiveness
&
Collapse

Revolution

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Historical Background

History of Modern Iran: Domestic/External Nexus

Qajar Era: Foreign Intervention from the Outside and the Inside

The political history of modern Iran since the Qajar era (1796-1925) is in part a tale of foreign intervention, foreign occupation, foreign invasion, and foreign competition for control of Iran's resources. Although this history is a catalogue of great power rivalries and intervention in Iran's domestic affairs, many Iranians themselves have also played a significant role in the underdevelopment of their political system and society—with and without foreign powers.

Nineteenth Century Qajar Era: Intervention From the Outside

Great power intervention and imperialism in Iran in the nineteenth century is succinctly summarized by Ervand Abrahamian   as follows:

> The impact of the West began as early as 1800, and took the form of military pressure first from the Russians and then from the British. Moving through Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Russians, equipped with modern artillery, easily defeated Iran's faction-ridden tribal contingents, and imposed on Fath 'Ali Shah [Qajar] the humiliating treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkomanchai (1828). Similarly, the British, eager to counterbalance Russian successes and to use Afghanistan as a buffer zone both against the tsars and against the Qajars, invaded southern Iran and extracted from the Shah the Treaty of Paris (1857). As a result of these treaties, the Qajars regained Tabriz and

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southern Iran; but lost Georgia, Armenia, and their Caspian navy, gave up all claims to Afghanistan, paid an indemnity of £3,000,000 to the tsars, and, most significant of all, granted a series of commercial capitulations to Russia and Britain. These capitulations enabled the two powers to open consular and commercial offices anywhere they wished, and exempted their merchants not only from the high import duties but also from internal tariffs, local travel restrictions, and the jurisdiction of Shari'a law courts. [15]

Nineteenth Century Qajar Era: Intervention From the Inside

During the nineteenth century, the foreign powers also intervened in Iran's politics from the inside. E.G. Watson, who was an attaché to the British Legation at the court of Persia, thus describes the foreign powers' intervention in Iran from the inside, at the court of Qajar Persia:

> ...various reasons induced the English authorities in India to dispatch to the court of Persia a mission of a more imposing character than that which had been entrusted to Mehdi Ali Khan. The success which had attended the negotiations of that envoy in his endeavours to prevail upon the Shah to attack the Affghans, had not been known to Calcutta when the Earl of Mornington selected Captain Malcolm for the purpose of proceeding to the Court of Tehran. No English diplomatist had until this time been employed in Persia since the reign of Charles the Second. Captain Malcolm was charged to make some arrangement for relieving India from the annual alarm occasioned by the threatened invasion of Zeman Khan[16]; to counteract any possible designs which the French nation might entertain with regard to Persia; and to endeavour to restore to somewhat of its former prosperity a trade which had been in great degree lost. The mission landed at Bushire on the first of the month of February of the year 1800, but it was not until the month of November of the same year that it reached the presence of the Shah. As a preliminary measure the envoy

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[15] Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). p.51.
[16] Prince of Afghanistan.

17

distributed presents to the various Persian officers with whom he was thrown in contact on the route from Bushire to Tehran, and on arriving at that city he laid at the feet of the King a costly offering of watches, arms, mirrors and jewels.[17]

Watson documents the results of the mission as follows :

Two months later a commercial treaty and a political treaty were concluded between the envoy from India and the prime minister of Persia, the observance of which was made binding on all Persians by a firman [decree] from the Shah. The first firman contained orders to the rulers, officers, and writers of the ports, sea-coasts, and islands of the provinces of Fars and Khuzistan, to take means to expel and extirpate any persons of the French nation who should attempt to pass these forts or boundaries, or desire to establish themselves on these shores or frontiers. By the commercial treaty it was stipulated that English and Indian traders and merchants should be permitted to settle, free from taxes, in any Persian seaport, and should be protected in the exercise of their commerce in the Shah's dominions. The English were likewise to be at liberty to build and to sell houses in any Persian port or city, and English iron, lead, steel, and broad-cloth were to be admitted into Persia free from duty, while the existing imposts on other goods were not to be increased. By the political treaty the Shah engaged to make no peace with his Affghan neighbour excepting upon the condition that the latter should agree to renounce all designs of attacking the Anglo-Indian possessions.[18]

"The Strangling of Persia"[19]

In the first decade of the twentieth century, a movement composed

of various strata of Iranian society demanded a constitution and a

parliament from the autocratic Qajar monarch, Mozaffar Al-Din Shah.

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[17] Robert Grant Watson, History of Persia (London, 1866), pp.126-127.
[18] Ibid, pp.127-128.
[19] This is the title of the personal narrative of W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (New York: The Century Co., 1912)

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The movement became known as the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911). The constitutionalists aimed at liberal reforms to at least limit the absolutist authority of the Qajar kings who ruled under the influence of British and Russian governments and representatives in Iran, and under whose reign, foreign concessions were granted, and there was intervention in Iran's domestic affairs.

The movement began when many of the constitutionalists organized a sit-in (bast) in the British Legation in Iran. The constitutionalists' movement was inspired by western democratic movements abroad, and many of the nationalist-constitutionalists lost their lives in this first struggle of Iranians in modern times to achieve liberalism.

Foreign intervention itself ended the constitutionalists' struggle. Britain and Russia were the main foreign players. In August 1906, Mozaffar Al-Din Shah finally agreed to a constitution and the establishment of a parliament (Majlis). From the beginning, the two powers continued to intervene in the domestic affairs of Iran. The account of this period is written by Morgan Shuster, the American financial advisor to Iran, as an introduction to his book, entitled The Strangling of Persia, which is an account of his days as the Treasurer-General of Persia.

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In 1907, during the crisis of the Constitutional Revolution, the two powers, Britain and Russia reached an agreement, known as the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. They pledged to respect the independence, integrity and sovereignty of Iran, but in fact divided Iran into their spheres of influence.[20] The Russians occupied the north, the British occupied the south, and a neutralized zone was established covering central Iran. The neutral zone was another area of Anglo-Russian rivalry and another zone of joint intervention in Iran's royal court and the domestic politics of Iran.

Open Intervention of the Russian and British Legations

Shuster refers to the Anglo-Russian interference in Iran's domestic affairs as "open intervention of the Russian and British Legations"[21] in Iran's internal affairs. Mozaffar al-Din Shah's successor, Muhammad Ali Shah, was against the constitutional movement. The constitutionalists and the nationalists struggled to restore the constitution, as the representatives of the nascent parliament met to deal with Iran's crises. The Russian troops (the Cossack Brigade) surrounded the Majlis building (Baharistan), and bombarded the Majlis.

Shuster writes:

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[20] For the text of the 1907 Convention, refer to Ibid, pp.xxiv-xxviii.
[21] Ibid, p.xxxv.

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Before sunrise on June 23 [1909], over 1000 Cossacks and other troops surrounded the Medjlis building and occupied the adjoining streets. The deputies and others who rushed to the scene were allowed to enter but not to come out. An hour later, Colonel Liakhoff [of the Cossack Brigade], with six other Russian officers, arrived and disposed the troops and six cannon so as to command the locality. Colonel Liakhoff then mounted a horse and rode off, whereupon the troops and guns under the command of the remaining Russian officers, opened fire on the Medjlis buildings, killing at the first volley a number of Nationalist volunteers who were there.

The 100 or more armed Nationalists who were present now returned the fire, putting three of the Cossack guns out of action. Cossack reinforcements arrived, and despite the odds against them, the volunteer defenders of the Medjlis kept up a a stout resistance for seven or eight hours until the buildings were badly damaged by the shells and shrapnel, and the inmates were either killed, captured or put to flight.

Many well-known Nationalists were arrested and strangled or imprisoned, and some who were being sought succeeded in making their escape. Colonel Liakhoff and his troops bombarded and looted for several days the homes of the persons disliked by the Shah. The records of the Medjlis even were destroyed. Colonel Liakhoff remained the virtual dictator of Tehran.[22]

This tragic loss of life ended a movement for liberal democracy in Iran. Throughout the modern era of great power rivalries, Iranian history is a catalogue of foreign intervention. Iranians have held the foreign powers responsible for their underdevelopment.

But Iranians themselves have played a significant role in the underdevelopment of their political system and society from the beginning of the modern era of great power rivalries to the present day.

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[22] Ibid, pp. xxxvi,xxxix

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This is clear, for example, beginning with the twentieth century, especially during the Constitutional Revolution. The nationalist-constitutionalists struggle for the restoration of the constitution continued in the backdrop of the farce of Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar's ties with the foreign powers, and the latter's role as the real players in Iran's political affairs. Shuster thus describes the final abdication of Mohammad Ali Shah:

> On July 16 at 8:30 A.M. the Shah, with a large body of his soldiers and attendants, took refuge in the Russian Legation in Zargundeh, some miles outside the city, and thus abdicated his throne. He had previously obtained the consent of the Legation to his doing this. Both Russian and British flags were hoisted over the Russian Minister's home as soon as it was occupied by the Shah.[23]

Late Qajar to Pahlavi Era

In 1909, the young Ahmad Shah Qajar succeeded the throne at the age of twelve. Historians have written little about his reign. The Qajar Dynasty was overthrown in the 1921 Coup by Reza Khan who became the Minister of War. In 1925 Reza Khan (later Reza Shah) established the Pahlavi Dynasty.

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[23] Ibid, p.xlvi.

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The World War II Crisis and the Fall of Reza Shah

Reza Shah introduced extensive socio-political reforms modeled after the secularization and modernization reforms of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. His economic ties to Nazi Germany during the Second World War led to the Allies' successful invasion of Iran to eliminate German influence, and to supply war materials to the Soviet Union via northern Iran. Iran was called the Bridge of Victory, and it was divided into three zones. The Soviets occupied the north and the British occupied the south. Reza Shah was exiled abroad. His twenty-year-old son, Mohammad Reza, succeeded to the throne as a constitutional monarch.

During WWII and in the immediate aftermath of the war, the capital of Iran, Tehran, the unoccupied zone, was the center of Anglo-Soviet rivalry in Iran. [24] They each formed an Iranian political party. The Soviet Union and Iranian Communists formed the Hezbi Tudeh (the Communist Party of Iran), and the British formed the Hezbi Eradeh-yi Melli (National Will Party) led by Seyyid Zia Al-Din Tabatabai. [25]

The domestic politics of Iran in this period was largely limited to Tudeh- Eradeh-yi Melli rivalry and propaganda and counter-propaganda.

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[24] On Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran from 1918 to 1948, refer to George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry (Ithaca, New York, 1949)
[25] According to L.P. Elwell Sutton, an Anglo-Iranian Oil Company official and a Press Attaché at the British Embassy following WWII, "...the fact that much of his [Seyyed Zia] exile had been spent in Palestine gave rise to the belief that he had British support, a belief to a large extent justified." L.P. Elwel Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran: 1941-1948", The Middle East Journal, January 1949, p.52.

The Azerbaijan Crisis over Iran's Petroleum Resources[26]

The Anglo-Russian intervention in Iran reached a crisis point in November 1945. The issue was the Soviet Union's demand for an oil concession from Azerbaijan to Khorasan, covering 200,000 square kilometers of northern Iran.[27]

Under the terms of the World War II Tripartite Treaty, the Allied troops were required to withdraw their troops from Iran. American troops had evacuated, the British departed later, but the Soviet troops refused to withdraw unless the Iranian government accepted an oil concession. To realize this plan, they intervened by establishing an autonomous republic in the northern territory of Iran: the Azerbaijan Republic. In Azerbaijan, the Tudeh (Communist Party of Iran) continued its activities under the name of Hizbi Demokrati Azerbaijan (the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan). Ja'afar Pishevari, the leader of both parties, with assistance from the Soviet army attacked the Iranian government forces in Azerbaijan, and established the Republic of Azerbaijan.

In the first stage, there was diplomatic action by the United States and Britain vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (exchange of notes, followed by a

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[26] This section—the Azerbaijan Crisis—is generally based on George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran,1918-1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry , pp.284-315.
[27] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Diplomatic Papers (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), Vol. V, p.453.

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discussion in the Second Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow), and the two powers applied pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw.

The Azerbaijan Crisis was placed on the agenda of the United Nations. At the United Nations, it was proposed that direct negotiations be conducted between Iran and the Soviet Union. The Iranian Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, led a mission to Moscow and negotiated with Stalin and Molotov. The Soviet Union proposed to withdraw its troops on several conditions, most importantly that Iran agree to an oil concession, this time, an Irano-Soviet oil company with 51 per cent of shares to the Soviet Union, and 49 per cent to Iran. The agreement was to be presented to and ratified by the Iranian parliament (the Majlis).

Ultimately the Majlis rejected the proposal, but above all, three factors—American diplomatic pressure in the United Nations; the Containment Policy of the Truman Administration, and Qavam's statesmanship—led to the liberation of Azerbaijan and the defeat of the Soviet oil concession.

The Crisis of Nationalization of Iran's Oil Industry and the Crisis of Democracy in Iran

The crisis of the 1951-1953 was a dual crisis. Iranians sought to nationalize their oil industry, and to liberalize the political system.

The Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, led both movements. He called for the limitation of Mohammad Reza Shah's

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authority. His thesis was that "The Shah must reign, not rule". During his administration, all political parties including the Tudeh party participated in Iran's political life.

The movement for the nationalization of Iran's oil industry was also led by Mossadegh. In 1951, the Iranian parliament nationalized Iran's oil industry under the leadership of premier Mossadegh who led an international campaign for the nationalization of Iran's oil industry.[28]

During this period, there existed Cold War spheres of influence for each bloc, and the west was concerned over the activities of Communist parties in the third world. During Mossadegh's premiership, the Tudeh Party (the Communist Party of Iran) actively participated in Iran's political life.

According to Cold War documents, published recently in The New York Times, the story of the 1953 Coup d'etat is a Cold War story of Communism and oil—a British-initiated and CIA-backed coup d'etat in 1953 removed Mossadegh from power.[29] This was not entirely a foreign imposed coup. As the article indicates, many Iranian agents also participated in the planning and carrying out the coup, particularly in the final stage—with and without the CIA's instructions.

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[28] Refer to Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers. (New York: John Wiley & Sons; Jerusalem: Israel University press, 1973), pp.89-126.
[29] James Risen, "How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79)", Secrets of History, The New York Times, April 16, 2000.

And thus began the second phase of the history of the old regime. This was an era of unparalleled socio-economic reforms in the modern history of Iran. Among them: secularization of society and the educational system, introduction of civil law, expansion of higher education, introduction of a modern health care system, and introduction and expansion of women's rights. But the political system remained underdeveloped—genuine political parties did not exist, there was lack of freedom of speech, and there was lack of freedom of the press.

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Part One:

Theoretical Framework

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Chapter 2

Theories of Revolution

Theories of revolution may be divided into two categories: 1) endogenous theories of revolution, that is, theories that explain revolutions in a domestic context, and 2) endogenous/exogenous theories of revolution, i.e. theories that examine revolutions in both domestic and international contexts. This chapter examines theories of revolution. However, this examination is largely limited to one aspect of revolution: the causes of revolution. Specifically, the causes of what has been called revolution from below. Therefore, many theories of revolution that study other aspects of revolution are excluded.

I. Endogenous Factors[30]

Marx's Theory of Revolution

Marx analyzed the causes of revolution in a socio-economic context, specifically that of class conflict. To Marx, the cause of revolution was the particular structure of society. Marx's theory of

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[30] The following categories of what are called here endogenous theories of revolution, is a classification provided by A.S. Cohan, Theories of Revolution: An Introduction (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975).

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revolution is not derived from a single work, but rather from a collection of his writings. A.S. Cohan has interpreted Marx's theory of revolution in the following sequence: mode of production determines the structure of social relations in which the ruling class exploits the dominated class, which causes alienation of the exploited class resulting in class consciousness and ultimately revolution. [31]

The development of class-consciousness is central to Marx's theory of revolution. Marx believed that revolution has two prerequisites: 1) an objective condition (high stage of development) and 2) a subjective condition (development of class-consciousness). However, Marx did not elaborate on the issue of how revolutionary consciousness is developed.[32]

As A.S. Cohan puts it:

> Marxian theory...has been the most influential theory of revolution in the past hundred years, yet...as a way of predicting outcomes it has not been validated with reference to industrial societies. Revolutions generally have not occurred in the societies of the West that were more advanced industrially and technologically in spite of the early expectations of Marx and Engels...Instead, the great Marxist-oriented revolutions have occurred in the technologically less advanced societies where the bourgeoisie was barely developed, and the working class, where it is to be found, was small as well.[33]

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[31] For a comprehensive study of Marx's theory of revolution, and Marxist theories of revolution, refer to A.S. Cohan, Theories of Revolution: An Introduction , pp. 54-118.
[32] Ibid, p.65.
[33] Ibid, p. 68.

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Nevertheless, the majority of revolutionaries in the twentieth century were influenced by the writings of Marx and Engels as well as Marxian interpretations of revolution such as Leninism and Maoism.

Lenin's Theory of Revolution

Both Marx's theory of revolution and its revision by Lenin were political tracts, written with the goal of facilitating the occurrence of a Communist revolution. Lenin's theory of revolution is a theory of revolutionary strategy.

Lenin, as a Russian opposition leader, produced some of his writing on revolution in exile. He left Russia in July 1900 and spent the subsequent seventeen years in Europe.[34]

Lenin's strategy was declared in <u>What Is To Be Done?</u> , written in exile in 1901-1902. The most important element of his strategy was the formation of a Vanguard Party, an organization composed of professional revolutionaries to guide and direct revolutionary activities. "Marx and Engels were not certain how class consciousness would develop, but with...[Lenin's] theory of the revolutionary party he [Lenin] seems to have gone considerably further".[35] As one analyst has stated, "the actuality of

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[34] For a chronology of Lenin's life and works refer to Robert C. Tucker, ed., <u>The Lenin Anthology</u> (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975), pp. xv-xxiii.
[35] A.S. Cohan, <u>Theories of Revolution</u>, pp.89-90.

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the revolution: this is the core of Lenin's thought and his decisive link with Marx".[36]

Other elements of Lenin's strategy of revolution were the formation of alliances and the initiation of agitations against the state. He stated that in launching the revolution, the proletariats must form alliances, and he considered the peasantry as a possible ally. Lenin also held that propaganda is an insufficient revolutionary tactic and that it must be complemented with agitation against the incumbent regime.[37]

Lenin's strategy of revolution identified two conditions, which have to be met, for a revolution to succeed: 1) an objective change (a revolutionary situation), and 2) a subjective change (strong mass action to overthrow the old regime).

In an article entitled "The Downfall of the Second International", written in 1915 and published in the Kommunist, the theoretical journal of the party, he stated his concept of the revolutionary situation[38] and in what circumstances it leads to revolution.

Lenin stated: "For a Marxist it is indubitable that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation, likewise that not every

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[36] George Lukacs, Lenin: A Study on the Unity of his Thought, trans. Nicholas Jacob, London, 1970, first published, 1924, p.11, cited in A.S. Cohan, Theories of Revolution, p.82.
[37] Vladimir Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?", in Robert C. Tucker, The Lenin Anthology , pp.34-39.
[38] Robert C. Tucker, The Lenin Anthology, P.275. Tucker has provided a condensed version of this article in Ibid, pp. 275-277.

revolutionary situation leads to a revolution."[39] He identified three main symptoms of a revolutionary situation:

> 1. The impossibility for the ruling classes to preserve their domination in unaltered form; this or that crisis 'up above', a crisis of the ruling class's policy, creating a fissure into which pour the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes. For a revolution to come about it is normally insufficient that 'those down below did not desire' to go on in the old way; it is also requisite that 'those up above were unable' to;
> 2. A more than normal aggravation of the want and tribulations of the oppressed classes,
> 3. A considerable rise, for the aforementioned reasons, in the level of activity of the masses, which in times of 'peace' calmly allow themselves to be robbed but in turbulent times are drawn into independent historical action both by the crisis situation as a whole and by those 'up above' themselves.[40]

Lenin stated that the above changes culminate in a revolutionary situation. As his third factor above indicates, Lenin believed that the revolutionary activity of the masses would not succeed unless a crisis occurs which paves the way for the revolutionaries to seize power. Writing during the First World War, Lenin held that war had created such crises in Russia and elsewhere in Europe.[41]

However, even the existence of a revolutionary situation and the existence of a crisis do not result in revolution. Lenin set forth a third requirement which he called the subjective change requisite: "the capacity of the revolutionary class to take mass revolutionary actions

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[39] Ibid, p. 275.
[40] Ibid, p. 275.
[41] Robert C. Tucker's preface to Lenin's article, Ibid, p. 275.

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that are strong enough to smash (or break up) the old government, which, not even in times of crises, will 'fall' unless it is 'dropped' ".[42]

The above reference, Lenin's subjective change requisite, the requirement that the masses actively "drop" or overthrow the old regime indicates a discrepancy of Marxist interpretation of revolution as inevitable.

Lenin's theory of revolutionary strategy was a guide adopted by most revolutionaries in the twentieth century, including those who became known as Marxist-Leninists, in various regions of the globe.

Lenin's strategy of revolution including the establishment of a revolutionary organization, the formation of alliances, the conduct of agitation, and how a revolutionary situation can be made into a revolution, partially accounts for the process of revolution as viewed from the perspective of the domestic opposition's activities against the old regimes.

Functionalist Approach

Chalmers Johnson, in his theory of revolution, has adopted the sociological functionalist framework, including the theories of Talcott

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[42] Ibid, p. 276.

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Parsons, an exponent of structural-functionalism, who set forth functional prerequisites that help maintain a social system's stability.[43]

In his functionalist approach, Johnson analyzes revolution in terms of the relationship between values and the environment. He identifies four sources of pressures, which he names as "sources of change", in a society: 1) exogenous value-changing sources 2) endogenous value-changing sources 3) exogenous environment-changing sources, and 4) endogenous environment-changing sources.[44] These pressures, according to Johnson, "destroy a system's equilibrium".[45] However, a society, which maintains values and environment "synchronized", does not experience a revolution.[46]

According to Johnson there are three causes of any revolution: 1) power deflation, 2) loss of authority, and 3) accelerators.[47] He states that the first two are remote causes and the third are immediate causes.[48] Power deflation is defined as a characteristic of the disequilibrated system, resulting from the use of force by a state. During power deflation, the elite have several alternatives, ranging from "conservative change" to "intransigence". If the former course of action is adopted by

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[43] Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change , Second Edition, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982) pp.11-12.
[44] Ibid, p. 66.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid, p.62.
[47] Ibid, pp.93-94.
[48] Ibid, pp. 94, 138.

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the leaders, then "the system moves toward resynchronization, the power deflation will disappear, and no revolution will take place."[49] However, Johnson states that the latter, elite intransigence, defined as "the frank, willful pursuit of reactionary policies by an elite—that is, policies that exacerbate rather than rectify a dissynchronized social structure..."[50], constitute "an underlying cause of revolution".

The second cause of revolution, according to Johnson, is "loss of authority", which he explains as being related to the quality of change undertaken in a society experiencing disequilibrium, and this quality of change depends on the ability of the "legitimate leaders". Johnson states: "if they are unable to develop policies that will maintain the confidence of the non-deviant actors in the system, a loss of authority will ensue."[51] This loss of authority will render the use of force illegitimate but it can lead to the maintenance of power, although it likely will result in a police state.

The third and last cause of revolution, according to Johnson, is "accelerators". He defines accelerators as "some ingredient, usually contributed by fortune, that deprives the elite of its chief weapon for enforcing social behavior (e.g., an army mutiny), or that leads a group of

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[49] Ibid, pp.96-97.
[50] Ibid,p. 97.
[51] Ibid, p.94.

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revolutionaries to believe that the time to strike is now."[52] Accelerators, as noted by Taylor, are chance factors[53], and Johnson's examples include "some factor beyond the control of the revolutionaries, such as the crippling of the armed forces; it may be a belief that the forces of a ruling elite can be incapacitated through direct action against them; or it may be the launching of a careful strategy of revolution."[54]

Johnson's concept of accelerators seems to concentrate on some aspect of the state's means of coercion, a factor, rightly named immediate by Johnson, which must be analyzed in short term causes of revolutions.

Johnson's inclusion of exogenous sources as pressures which result in the system's disequilibrium is one of the strengths of his theory of revolution. His emphasis on sources of pressure emanating from outside of the system is one of his primary contributions to the study of revolution. Johnson has provided several examples of the two exogenous sources of change that he has identified. His examples of exogenous sources of value change that could be interpreted as factors causing change in the values of segments of population in other countries include:

> Global communications, the rise of external 'reference groups' (e.g., the effects of the French and Russian revolutions on neighboring populations ...), the internal mobilizations and refugee migrations

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[52] Ibid.
[53] Stan Taylor, <u>Social Science And Revolutions</u> (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p.16.
[54] Chalmers Johnson, <u>Revolutionary Change</u>, pp.138-139.

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caused by wars, and the work of groups such as Christian missionaries, communist parties, the Peace Corps, and UNESCO-all have led to cultural contact...[55]

As mentioned earlier, Johnson holds that resynchronization prevents revolution. It may be argued that a society is not homogenous. Different strata of a society may view value/environment change from a different perspective. The adoption of certain values may antagonize some, and withholding the same values may antagonize others. A question which may be raised is: how can a state determine which changes produce evolutionary outcomes and which will lead to revolutionary outcomes? Johnson's qualification of the concept of "intentional 'conservative' change" has provided an answer. Johnson writes: "The successful implementation of conservative change depends on two factors: the elite's familiarity with social conditions, and its ability to determine which elements of value structure are indispensable to the continuity of the culture."[56] Johnson's examples include the New Deal in the United States, reform acts, and restoration of democracy.

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[55] Ibid, p.67.
[56] Ibid, p.96.

Psychological Theories

Psychological theories of revolution are divided into four categories: 1) repression of instincts, 2) rising expectations, 3) J-Curve, and 4) relative deprivation.[57]

Pitirim Sorokin, a Russian sociologist is the exponent of the theory of repressive instincts. Sorokin believed that "the immediate cause of revolution is always the growth of 'repression' of the main instincts of the majority of society, and the impossibility of obtaining for those instincts the necessary minimum of satisfaction."[58] He referred to various physical (e.g. alimentary or hunger) and psychological (e.g. freedom) repression of instincts. Sorokin emphasized that "it is necessary that the 'repression' should spread, if not over the large majority, at least over a considerable part of society."[59] Sorokin held that besides 1) repression of instincts and 2) the general or widespread character of repression of instincts, there is a third cause which brings about a revolution. On this third cause, Sorokin states:

> It is also necessary that those social groups which defend the existing order should lack the means for the suppression of subversive attempts. When to the growing revolutionary force of the 'repressed' instincts those groups can oppose the force of restraint, and thus counter-balance the pressure, revolution is not unavoidable. There will be only a series of spontaneous suppressed riots. But when the

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[57] This is a partial classification of A.S. Cohan in Theories of Revolution, p.177.

[58] Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Sociology of Revolution (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1925), p.367.

[59] Ibid, p.369.

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groups which stand for order are unable to exercise that restraining influence, a revolution is inevitable.[60]

The above passage suggests that Sorokin's third cause of revolution is related to the means of coercion and to suppression. This is an important reference because in the domestic context of revolution, it is a factor in revolutions.

Social scientists have categorized Alexis de Tocqueville, the renowned French scholar and politician of the nineteenth century, as an exponent of the theory of rising expectations as a cause of revolution. Writing on the French Revolution of 1789, Tocqueville held that "those parts of France in which the improvement in the standard of living was most pronounced were the chief centers of the revolutionary movement."[61] He concluded:

> Thus it was precisely in those parts of France where there had been most improvement that popular discontent ran highest. This may seem illogical—but history is full of such paradoxes. For it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out. On the contrary, it oftener happens that when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it. Thus the social order overthrown by a revolution is almost always better than the one immediately preceding it, and experience teaches us that, generally speaking, the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways. Only consummate statecraft can enable a King to save his throne when after a long spell of oppressive rule he sets to improving the lot of his subjects.

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[60] Ibid, p.370.
[61] Alexis De Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution ,Translated by Stuart Gilbert. (New York: Anchor Books, 1955), p.175.

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Patiently endured so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds. For the mere fact that certain abuses have been remedied draws attention to the others and they now appear more galling; people may suffer less, but their sensibility is exacerbated.[62]

In 1962, James C. Davies synthesized Marx's thesis on social unrest and de Tocqueville's thesis on rising expectations and put forth his J-Curve theory of revolution. Interpreting Marx's theory, Davies states that Marx "described, as a pre-condition of widespread unrest, not progressive degradation of the proletariat but rather an improvement in workers' economic condition which did not keep pace with the growing welfare of the capitalists and therefore produced social tension."[63] He then quotes the passage above from de Tocqueville's theory. Synthesizing Marx and de Tocqueville's writings, Davies holds that "revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal."[64] Davies stresses that "it is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision of 'adequate' or 'inadequate' supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produces the revolution." [65]

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[62] Ibid, pp.176-177.
[63] James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, Volume 27, Number 1, February 1962, p.5.
[64] Ibid, p.6.
[65] Ibid.

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Nine years after the publication of this article, in a book edited by Davies, the same article was republished. In the preface to this article, it is stated that the theory has led to confusion among scholars. It is emphasized that: "the thesis is a fundamentally psychological one, referring to individuals rather than social aggregates; revolution is most likely to occur when a long period of rising expectations and gratifications is followed by a period during which gratifications (socioeconomic or otherwise) suddenly drop off while expectations (socio-economic or otherwise) continue to rise."[66]

Here, Davies' theory of revolution may be contrasted with Sorokin's theory of revolution. Whereas Sorokin emphasized the socio-psychological situation in which there does not exist even the least freedom or welfare, Davies states that revolution occurs in a country in which the most tolerable situation exists, that is, the lowest point in his J-Curve. Another difference is that, for Sorokin the socio-psychological factors that cause revolutions are objective and actual, but for Davies, these factors are the state-of-mind of individuals. Rather, for Davies, this actuality is located above the J-Curve, an area, a situation, which according to him does not cause revolution.

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[66] James C. Davies,ed., <u>When Men Revolt-And Why: A Reader in Political Violence and Revolution</u> (New York: Free Press, 1971), p.133.

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Ted Robert Gurr considers revolution as a specific form of organized political violence, and more specifically as a form of "internal war". Gurr's typology of internal war also includes terrorism, guerrilla wars, and civil wars.[67]

In his study of revolution, Gurr advances several hypotheses as the factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of revolution. Among these hypotheses, Gurr's hypotheses regarding the concept of Relative Deprivation (RD) has received the most attention. Gurr defines Relative Deprivation as an individual or society's "perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities"[68], which he explains as the discrepancy between what people expect to be rightly entitled to and what they are capable of attaining and keeping[69]. Gurr emphasizes the perception of individuals and society.

Another direct factor in increasing the likelihood of revolution, or in other words, another causal factor in revolution is related to Gurr's concept of "the balance of institutional support".[70] Revolution, according to Gurr, occurs when the revolutionaries "institutional support" is more than that of the regime[71], a situation which can occur when the revolutionaries 1) create new organizations and attract other oppositional

[67] Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p.11.
[68] Ibid, p.24.
[69] Ibid, p.13.
[70] Ibid, chapter 9.
[71] Ibid.

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elements 2) take over the political, economic and military organizations of the regime through an "internal coup d'etat", and 3) convert neutral elements to active opposition.[72]

In the domestic context and factors of revolution, Gurr's third factor is significant. Some revolutionaries in their attempt to broaden the scope of revolution from limited to mass based, have adopted this as one of their strategies. To win over the masses, some revolutionaries create destructive situations to, as Gurr says, convert the neutral to active opposition. This was one of the strategies adopted by the Iranian revolutionaries in the Iranian Revolution. In 1979, the Iranian revolutionaries set fire to a packed theatre, massacring 400-450 people at the Rex Cinema in the city of Abadan[73], and blamed the Shah's regime for this tragedy. Since it was only after the revolution that a trial established the truth that the perpetrators were the Iranian opposition, that is, the Shah's opponents, therefore it revolutionized the depoliticized masses and mobilized them against the regime.

Another direct cause of revolution, according to Gurr, is the relative "coercive control" (e.g. use of force) of the regime and the opposition. Regarding the use of force and revolution, a factor which in the domestic context of revolution plays an important role in determining

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[72] Ibid,pp.277-279.
[73] For a chronology of the Iranian Revolution refer to Jerrold D. Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp.152-165.

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the success or failure of revolution, Gurr's thesis is that a regime's use of force results in counterforce, that is, the opposition resorts to more violence, not less.[74] He concludes that in the long-term, the use of force does not deter dissident violence.

Another strength of Gurr's theory of revolution is his hypotheses of indirect causes of revolution as external support for dissidents including military support (training, military equipment and military units)[75]. He cites French support for the American colonies, as an example.[76]

Critique of Endogenous Theories of Revolution

Theorists of revolution who have analyzed the causes of revolution in a domestic context, have contributed to the study of the causes of revolution. These theorists have illuminated many aspects of revolutionary processes and causes of revolution. These include: Social disequilibrium (Johnson), repressed instincts of various types (Sorokin), rising expectations in tolerable but declining socio-economic circumstances (Davies), and relative deprivation and organizational superiority of the revolutionaries including the revolutionizing of the neutral populace (Gurr).

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[74] Ibid, p.232.
[75] Ibid, p.269.
[76] Ibid, p.270.

The weakness of these theories is limiting levels of analysis to the individual and society. To determine the causes of revolution, we need to broaden our level of analysis to the state, and a level higher, that of the international system. Subsequent theorists have contributed to the study of revolutions by analyzing revolution from a state/society level of analysis while also contributing to the study of the state/international system level of analysis and exogenous factors in revolutions.

II. Endogenous/ Exogenous Factors

Theda Skocpol's pioneering work on endogenous/exogenous factors in revolution, States and Social Revolutions, accounts for causes of revolution by taking into consideration both domestic and external factors.

Skocpol's theory of revolution concerns specifically social revolutions, which she defines as "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures, accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below."[77]

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[77] Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, & China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.33.

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Skocpol's structural perspective on revolutions has influenced many subsequent theorists and analysts of revolution. "Structural perspective", she writes, "means a focus on relationships, this must include transnational relations as well as relations among differently situated groups within given countries."[78] In her comparative study of the French (1789), Russian (1917) and the Chinese (1911) revolutions, she holds that in all three revolutions, the domestic class structure and international crises intersected at the state, causing the breakdown of the states. "Caught in cross-pressures between domestic class structures and international exigencies, the autocracies and their centralized administrations and armies broke apart, opening the way for social revolutionary transformations spearheaded by revolts from below."[79] This is significant because as aptly stated by Skocpol, international crises in part cause the breakdown of states, and state breakdown precedes revolutionary movements. In the Iranian revolution, international crises existed. It was international intervention and lack of intervention by other states that in part caused the breakdown of the state, and it was the breakdown of the monarchical regime, which partly allowed the mobilization of the revolutionaries, and consequently the launching of the revolution.

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[78] Ibid, p.19.
[79] Ibid, p.47.

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The state, according to Skocpol, is undermined due to several weaknesses: underdeveloped agrarian economy, leverage of the dominant class, and international pressures. These factors and peasant insurrections cause revolutions.

International pressures in revolution, according to Skocpol are defeat in wars and "imperialist intrusions". These international pressures, against the background of uneven economic development, bring about revolutionary crises. On the latter, she writes: "all modern social revolutions, in fact, must be seen as closely related in their causes, and accomplishments to the internationally uneven spread of capitalist economic development and nation-state formation on a world scale."[80] She continues: "as capitalism has spread across the globe, transnational flows of trade and investment have affected all countries—though in uneven and often contrasting ways."[81]

Against this background of the uneven spread of capital, Skocpol writes, "developments within the international state system as such—defeat in wars or threats of invasion and struggle over colonial controls—have directly contributed to virtually all outbreaks of revolutionary crises. For such developments have helped to undermine existing political authorities and state controls, thus opening the way for basic

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[80] Ibid, p.19.
[81] Ibid, p.20.

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conflicts and structural transformations."[82] This argument is significant. It indicates that developments in the international system are important, and also indicates that there are three general stages of revolution: 1) international influences contribute to the emergence of revolutionary crises, 2) international influences weaken the "political authority and state control" of a pre-revolutionary state, and 3) it is only after the former stage, the breakdown of the state, that revolutionary movements are launched.

Skocpol's emphasis on international factors include military competition, more specifically, war: Her case studies include France's competition with England and defeats in wars, Russia's defeats in wars including WWI, and China's defeats in wars and being faced with imperialism.

Skocpol's theory of revolution, including her pioneering emphasis on international factors and the international system in explaining revolutions, has introduced a new paradigm in the study of revolution.

Skocpol's theory of revolution is applicable to the Iranian Revolution, and a partial application of her theory of revolution and its relevant aspect to the Iranian Revolution follows. There were international factors in the Iranian Revolution. International influences in the Iranian Revolution weakened the state, the Shah's regime; the

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[82] Ibid, p.23.

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state collapsed in part due to international pressures; the collapse of the Shah's regime preceded the outbreak of the revolutionary movement by the Iranian revolutionaries; and it was the collapse of the state which opened the way for the launching of the revolutionary movement by the Iranian opposition.

Theda Skocpol's theory of revolution holds that international pressures weaken the pre-revolutionary state, and that the state breaks down in part due to international pressures. It is argued here that in the Iranian Revolution, as in the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, international factors weakened the Shah's regime. The conclusion reached here is that international factors caused the collapse of the state in two respects: 1) intervention, and 2) lack of support by the international state system. One example of the latter is the Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy and the Debate in the Administration, which as Chapter Four has indicated had an impact on the political leadership of the old regime. The channels of communication between the two states was not clear. There was a paralysis of the state.

The Soviet Union's intervention against the old regime and in support of the revolutionaries, and the lack of support by the Carter Administration, the European community, and regional allies, left the ancien régime without allies both regionally and globally. Faced with international and domestic pressure, international intervention, and lack

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of support by other states in the international system, the regime collapsed.

Walter L. Goldfrank in his case study of the Mexican Revolution has put forth four factors as the "necessary and sufficient" causes of revolution: "1) a tolerant or permissive world context; 2) a severe political crisis paralyzing the administrative and coercive capacities of the state; 3) widespread rural rebellion; and 4) dissident elite political movements."[83]

It is the first factor, exogenous factors, which is relevant to our inquiry here. Goldfrank's theory of "favorable world context" outlines three possible circumstances under which the likelihood of revolution increases. They are: 1. "the preoccupation of major powers in war or serious internal difficulty", 2. "when major powers balance one another, especially if that balance is antagonistic", and 3) "if rebel movements receive greater outside support than their enemies."[84] He adds that " 'outside intervention' in support of the old order may deepen and further the revolutionary process if it comes too little or too late."[85]

Goldfrank asks why there was a favorable world context in the Mexican Revolution. His answer is that, primarily, it was the way the

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[83] Walter L. Goldfrank, "Theories of Revolution and Revolution Without Theory: The Case of Mexico", Theory and Society, Volume 7, Nos. 1 and 2, January-March 1979, p.148. Also in jack A. Goldstone, Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1994).
[84] Ibid, p.149.
[85] Ibid.

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United States handled the situation in Mexico. He puts forth three "permissive" world contexts in regard to the Mexican Revolution. The first is "the changing balance of power in the Caribbean region which made it progressively less possible for Mexico to continue the diplomatic balancing act of playing off European versus U.S. interests."[86] The latter two deal with the United States' policy—specifically the lack of a clear policy—and later what he believes was President Wilson's confused policy, which he refers to as his call for popular sovereignty and free elections[87], and the third, the United States' involvement in the First World War which "left Mexico alone for a time."[88]

Goldfrank's theory has filled a gap in our knowledge regarding exogenous factors in revolution, more specifically, that the lack of support by a major power is a factor to consider in determining the causes of revolution. That lack of support, according to Goldfrank, is primarily preoccupation with other issues, domestic or international.

Regarding intervention, Goldfrank's argument that "outside intervention" may "deepen or further" a revolutionary process is valid and explains one of the significant aspects of international politics and revolution.

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[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid, p.150.
[88] Ibid.

Another study of revolution dealing with exogenous factors is an edited book named <u>Superpowers and Revolution</u> with the central theme of the intervention and nonintervention of the United States and the Soviet Union vis-à-vis countries experiencing revolution.[89] The emphasis is on superpower intervention and non-intervention decisions. Introducing the work, Adelman states that the "stress is on the content of the interventionary policy and the decision-making and bargaining process that led to the choice."[90] Three articles in this volume, authored by Bailey, Cottam and Goldstone are relevant to this study.

In "Revolution and the International System", Jennifer Bailey applies the concepts of political, military and economic dependency in analyzing the process of revolution. Her study concerns "factors that shape the revolutionary process once it has begun."[91] Bailey states that there are two elements in the international system which should be considered in regard to the process of revolution and intervention. She writes: "The nature of foreign intervention in social revolution is related to the position of the revolutionary nation on the 'maps' of both the International State System and the International Economic System."[92] The former, she says, refers to the unequal political status of great

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[89] Jonathan R. Adelman,ed. <u>Superpowers and Revolution</u> (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986).
[90] Ibid, p.12.
[91] Jennifer Bailey, "Revolution and the International System", in Ibid, p. 16.
[92] Ibid, p.15.

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powers and the countries that comprise their spheres of influence.[93] The latter, she states, refers to the capitalist world economy.[94]

Bailey's argument that "dependency increases the chance of intervention, it also makes a country more vulnerable to intervention in its revolutionary process"[95] is valid.

Other than the dependency paradigm, an alternative context for studying revolution is what constitutes the central element of the balance of power, that is rational actors in the international system maximizing their interests whether as states or non-state actors in the dynamic context of international relations.

Martha L. Cottam in "Responding to Revolution: Why Do They Decide to Intervene?" has analyzed the decision-making process and the problems which policy-makers face in responding to a revolutionary state using a political-psychology framework.

For Cottam, the decision-making problems facing policy makers in dealing with a revolutionary state is a "perceptual problem"[96]. She states that it is unlikely that policy makers would make ideal or optimal decisions in such circumstances, that is, they "deviate" from that

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[93] Ibid, p.17.
[94] Ibid, p.18.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Martha L. Cottam, "Responding to Revolution: Why Do They Decide to Intervene?", in Adelman,ed., Superpowers and Revolution, p. 27.

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standard because they simplify the political realities of other states through images such as stereotyping.[97]

Another problem she states is the "psychological difficulties involved in adapting to revolutionary change."[98] In such circumstances, if a revolutionary state is unlike any other in the past, the policy makers will misclassify and hence "improperly" respond to the new state. Alternatively, they may be so perplexed that they cannot classify it and do not have any "previous experience to rely upon for instruction in how to respond."[99] The example in Cottam's case is the Iranian Revolution as both the anti-United States and the anti-Soviet orientation of the revolutionary state.

Cottam's article has contributed to our understanding of the decision-making dilemmas which states face in responding to the state that has come to power as a result of revolution.

Cottam discusses revolution from the point of the post revolutionary situation, the coming to power of a revolutionary state. It is argued here that international influences (e.g., states in the international system) exert influence in all the stages of revolution.

Jack A. Goldstone's theory of revolution deals with the particular political system of the states which experienced revolution in the

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[97] Ibid, p. 30.
[98] Ibid, p. 27.
[99] Ibid, p. 33.

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twentieth century and how and why that particular political system made those states vulnerable to revolution[100]. Using Eisenstadt's definition of "neopatrimonialism", modernizing states with psudo-democratic institutions but in fact ruled by a single "chief of state", Goldstone states that neopatrimonial states, because they rely on the support of elites ("traditional oligarchs, new professionals and military/bureaucratic elites"[101]) to rule the depoliticized masses, are domestically vulnerable to revolutions due to three factors:

> First, since it relies chiefly on elite support, rather than on mass support, alienation of too many segments of the elite can be fatal. Second, since the elites themselves are divided, the chief executive must perform a complex balancing act to preserve the alliance of diverse elites while fending off their intra-elite conflicts. Third, since the population is depoliticized, the state can be threatened by mass-mobilizing movements that place new forces in the political arena.[102]

Therefore, he concludes that if the elites defect and mobilize the masses against the state, the ruler is faced with a situation in which there are "few defenses other than sheer armed force, whose loyalty itself is never assured"[103].

On exogenous factors, Goldstone states that "international pressures have always been an important factor in the development of

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[100] Jack A. Goldstone, "Revolution in Modern Dictatorships" in Revolution: Theoretical, comparative, and Historical Studies, pp.70-77. This is a revised version of Goldstone's article in Adelman, ed. Superpowers and Revolution.
[101] Goldstone, "Revolution in Modern Dictatorships", p.72.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.

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revolutionary crises. Such pressures have become even more important in the contemporary world [the Cold War era], as international superpowers—the United States and the [former] Soviet Union—ha[d] sought to support or undermine regimes in developing states in pursuit of geopolitical strategy."[104] He states that three factors account for the reason U.S. policy "exacerbated the vulnerability of neopatrimonial states"[105]:

> First, overdependence on the United States was encouraged. A massive flow of foreign and military aid often precluded the need for a foreign executive to build a democratic base....Second, overidentification of the chief executive with the U.S. aid irritated elites and provoked nationalist opposition to the regime...Third, while the United States sought to increase the dependence of the chief executive on U.S. aid, it also sought to impose domestic policies that weakened the executive—limits on coercion, greater political expression for professional elites and skilled workers, meaningful elections, and restrictions on corruption."[106]

The latter, Goldstone states, although desirable policies, proved to be a contradictory goal: "...the overriding goal of U.S. foreign policy—encouraging democratization—was incompatible with keeping these geopolitical allies, for democratization would undermine the rulers that the United States claimed to support."[107] He refers to one such policy as United States' human rights policy with the consequence of "greater

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[104] Ibid, p. 75.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid, p. 76.

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room to maneuver for the domestic opposition to the Shah in Iran, and to Somoza in Nicaragua."[108]

Goldstone's theory is a contribution to the theories of revolution, and it furthers our understanding of the political system that makes states vulnerable to revolution. It is valid in terms of the domestic aspect of revolution and international factors. Democratic political systems are less likely to experience revolutions. Therefore, the intermediate variable in neopatrimonial states, that is, the elite, do not serve the same function. Hence, their defection and their mobilization of the masses are meaningless in a democracy, as is overdependence and overidentification with an external power, and the promotion of democracy by other states in the international system.

Goldstone examines international pressures exerted by superpowers in the Cold War. The Cold War bipolar actors were significant actors in revolutions. We should also consider the role of other states in the international state system. Middle powers and lesser powers or regional powers may also play a role in revolutions.

Fred Halliday, in Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power[109], utilizes "international sociology" as his

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[108] Ibid.
[109] Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). The Sixth Power in the subtitle, refers to Marx's term for revolution. "Writing in 1854, when world politics was dominated by the pentarchy, the rule of five great powers, and Europe was preoccupied by the Crimean

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framework of analysis. He explains this framework of analysis as: "a context of a unified, if diverse, system, comprised of states, social and economic structures, and ideologies and cultures."[110]

He refers to two types of relations in this context: "such an approach would take as its starting point...an international system constituted by the interactions of states, on the one hand, and by that of the broader civil society—economic, social, ideological, cultural—factors on the other." [111]

According to Halliday, the extant theories of revolution exclude two factors: 1) external relations of societies and nations, and 2) ideology. He considers the above two factors as the exogenous causes of revolution. He writes that there is a "double exclusion" in the theories revolution on the causes of revolution— "of the international from the analysis of society, and of ideology from the study of revolution." [112]

What is the impact of ideology on revolution? Halliday states: " the objective impact is evident from the spread of such influential ideas as Protestantism in the sixteenth century, or of nationalism, socialism, anarchism and Islamic radicalism in the nineteenth and the twentieth

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War, Karl Marx argued that it was a sixth power, revolution, which would prevail over the other five." Ibid, Preface, xiii.
[110] Ibid, pp. 162-163.
[111] Ibid, p. 163.
[112] Ibid, p.171.

centuries." [113] He continues that "equally significant has been the spread of specific radical and revolutionary ideas in the past two centuries. This applies to very general principles—the equality of men, or the rights of the workers and/or peasants, or of women suffrage—and to principles of organization, such as the 'vanguard party' or guerrilla war."[114]

Halliday believes that ideology accounts for the cause of revolution in two respects: its impact on the leader of the revolution, and on the revolutionaries. Halliday writes: "The impact of ideas acts upon the supposed leaders of revolution, who may be inspired and instructed. It also acts on those who follow them and who, while adjusting and changing ideas from other contexts, may be galvanized into believing that something different within their own societies is possible." [115]

Halliday's theory of the role of transnational ideology in revolution is one of his contributions to the study of exogenous factors in revolution. He believes that ideology also plays a role in revolutionary mobilization. He states that beginning with the French Revolution, "the very adaptation, and exaggeration, of struggle elsewhere played its part in mobilizing movements..." [116]

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[113] Ibid, p.180.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid, pp. 181-182.

Halliday also refers to the "foreign policies of revolutionary states". This aspect deals with the state after the revolution has already occurred. Another aspect of the exogenous causes of revolution may also consider the foreign policy and the foreign relations of the pre-revolutionary state vis-à-vis the international system, both the system and subsystem which would include the alliances in which the pre-revolutionary state has participated as well as global and regional alliances affecting the pre-revolutionary state.

Halliday discusses states in regard to the causes of revolution in his analysis of "direct assistance or input into the growth of revolutionary movements" [117]. Although he cites French support for the American Revolution, and Germany's support of Lenin "enabling him to cross from Switzerland to Russia in 1917 and so be able to organize, in place, the Bolshevik seizure of power"[118], and the support of Cuba, Algeria and Egypt which "helped to finance, train and arm guerillas from other countries"[119], he concludes that "such external factors do not, notoriously, constitute causes of revolution, in the sense of being necessary and sufficient conditions for the eventual triumph of the

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[117] Ibid, p.182.
[118] Ibid, p.184.
[119] Ibid, p.183.

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revolution: they are never sufficient, and may not always be necessary."
[120] He concludes that this is an issue of "historical judgment".

Critique of Endogenous/Exogenous Theories of Revolution

Extant theories of revolution which consider both exogenous and endogenous factors in revolution have contributed to our understanding of revolution. Causal factors in revolution include the international system: military competition and imperialism, uneven economic development, international crises in part causing the breakdown of states, and state breakdown preceding revolutionary movements (Skocpol), lack of support by a superpower in the process of revolution and international intervention as deepening or furthering the revolutionary process (Goldfrank), unequal political status and economic development (Bailey),the political-psychology aspect of the decision-making process of superpowers in responding to revolutions (Cottam), the political system of the pre-revolutionary state as a vulnerability which is exacerbated by U.S. policy (Goldstone), and transnational ideology and examples, and exogenous assistance or "input" into the growth of revolutionary movements (Halliday).

There are three general deficiencies in the existing literature on exogenous factors in revolution. First, all theorize exclusively about the

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[120] Ibid, p.184.

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international state system. However, both states and non-state actors may be causal factors in revolution.

Intergovernmental organizations have an impact on revolutions. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have been causal factors in at least two revolutions in the twentieth century. Jack A. Goldstone has referred to the impact of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the Nicaraguan Revolution. Goldstone writes: "The Somoza's rule came to an end in 1979 as a consequence of international pressures, elite opposition, and popular revolts. International pressures came from the United States, which under President Carter's human rights policy, forced Somoza to ease repression aimed at his opponents, and from the International Monetary Fund, which forced Somoza to devalue Nicaragua's currency and institute economic reforms."[121]

IFI's, in particular the IMF's impact on revolution is due to the impact of two factors: the IMF conditionality agreements, and the IMF structural adjustment program. In the Philippines Revolution (1986), the latter two, specifically the devaluation of currency, tax increases, imposition of new taxes and tightening of domestic credit, in part contributed to unemployment, inflation, and socio-political unrest,

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[121] Jack A. Goldstone, ed., Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies, Second Edition, p.147.

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supplemented with domestic factors contributing to the occurrence of the revolution.[122]

Second, in analyzing the international state system, only superpowers are considered as factors in revolution. The subsystems/Regional powers may also have an impact on revolution.

Third, the theories account for exogenous factors as having an impact on a revolution once the pre-revolutionary state undergoes a revolution. Skocpol's theory is an exception (and Halliday's theory). Skocpol argues that international factors undermine the state because it affects the political authority (which she defines as administrative and coercive organizations) of the pre-revolutionary state. This is significant because international factors weaken the state, and contribute to the emergence of revolutionary crises.

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[122] On the political-economy of the Philippines, refer to Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., "The Marcos Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt in the Philippines" in Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins, Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 3, Country Studies-Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago, 1989), pp. 371-614.

Chapter 3
Theories of International Relations

I. Polarity and Revolution

Deutsch and Singer's concept of "Interaction Opportunity" is applicable to revolutions and the international system. Interaction opportunity in a multipolar system enables states to have more alternatives to avert threats to their stability from the outside.

Deutsch and Singer's theory of "interaction opportunity" holds that an increase in the number of independent actors (their independent variable) results in an increase of possible dyads in the international system, which in turn increases the range of possible interactions to each state actor as well as the total system (their intervening variable), hence resulting in stability (their dependent variable). Deutsch and Singer write: "as additional actors are brought into the system, the range of possible interactions open to each-and hence to the total system-increases."[123] And, a "shortage of alternative partners", they state, is "one of the greatest threats to the stability of any impersonal social system." [124]

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[123] Karl W. Deutsch and David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability" in World Politics , Volume XVI, Number 3, April 1964, p. 394.
[124] Ibid.

This theory may be adapted to the analysis of revolution where the units of analysis are the state and the international system. The opportunities for interaction open to states in a multipolar international system enables states to have more alternatives than in a bipolar system and therefore to block threats (by international state-actors) to their stability even when stability is defined so as to include the domestic political structure of a state, the target of revolution.

In their definition of stability, and in referring to individual states, Deutsch and Singer define stability as "the probability of their continued political independence and territorial integrity without any significant probability of becoming engaged in a 'war for survival'."[125] This definition can be broadened to include the survival of the state in its domestic context while concomitantly considering international intervention by state and non-state actors threatening the survival of the pre-revolutionary state in pre-revolutionary and/ or revolutionary situations.

The more polar actors, even more actors, there are, the more possible patterns of interaction there are. Deutsch and Singer write: "The most obvious effect of an increase in the number of independent actors is an increase in the number of possible pairs or dyads in the total system...as a nation enters into the standard coalition it is much less of a free agent than it was while non-aligned. That is, its alliance partners

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[125] Ibid, pp.390-391.

now exercise an inhibiting effect—or perhaps even a veto—upon its freedom to interact with non-alliance nations."[126]

Therefore, it is possible for a pre-revolutionary state in which international factors have just commenced their interventionary policy (early revolutionary situation) or later during the next two stages of the revolutionary situation (mid-revolutionary situation, and late revolutionary situation) to avert a revolution by forming new alliances during revolutionary crises.

In the Iranian Revolution, the bipolar structure of the international system was a factor to consider in the limitation of "interaction opportunity" open to the regime. The regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was established and overthrown during the Cold War. Iran was in the United States' sphere of influence and the Carter Administration was divided regarding the Iranian Revolution, Iran's ties with the second world (in Cold War terminology) as well as with the non-aligned third world were limited. The only formal alliance in which the regime participated was CENTO, which again, although not having the United States as an official participant, was limited to a Cold War alliance, in

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[126] Ibid, p.392.

particular, one form of alliance which Walt has referred to as a security cooperation for "Balance of Threat"[127].

The Sub-System: Regional Actors

Professor Leonard Binder, in an article in <u>World Politics</u> entitled "The Middle East As a Subordinate International System", [128] introduced the concept of "subordinate international systems" and the field of the study of the Middle East, in this context, including the International Relations of the Middle East, in 1958. He has defined this concept as follows:

> ...There exists a system of US-USSR relations characterized by bipolarity in the sense that there are only two actors of importance involved. ...this bipolar system is the dominant one in the world today, and...the relationship of other systems to it is that of subordination—in the sense that changes in the major system will have a greater effect on a minor system than the reverse.[129]

In the Iranian Revolution, this subordinate system is the context of the Shah's regime's ties with the regional powers/actors which in addition to polar actors, were also causal factors in the revolution.

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[127] Stephen M. Walt, <u>The Origins of Alliances</u> (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987).
[128] Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System", <u>World Politics</u>, Volume X, Number 3, April 1958, pp.408-429.
[129] Ibid, p.410.

II. International Intervention

International Intervention and Revolution

Definition

First, a definition of international intervention is necessary that is applicable to the context of this study, i.e. the study of revolution from the perspective of the pre-revolutionary state and its ties to the international system. Elements of several definitions are useful for this purpose.

One is Rosenau's definition of international intervention as 1) "convention breaking", and 2) "authority oriented".[130] He stresses that both must be present:

> Stated briefly, all kinds of observers from a wide variety of perspectives seem inclined to describe the behavior of one international actor toward another as interventionary whenever the form of the behavior constitutes a sharp break with then-existing forms *and* whenever it is directed at changing or preserving the structure of authority in the target society.[131]

Both elements are relevant to the study of revolution. Since the target of state and non-state actors as causal factors in revolution is primarily the pre-revolutionary state, the bilateral relations of the actor with the pre-revolutionary state before and during the revolution, as well

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[130] James N. Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention", The Journal of International Affairs, Volume XXII, Number 2, 1968, p. 161.
[131] Ibid.

as the actor's behavior directed at the political authority, are both relevant. In the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet Union's behavior directed at the old regime were both convention-breaking and authority-oriented.

One of the significant aspects of Rosenau's definition of the concept of intervention is applied throughout this dissertation. That aspect is the exclusion of motives and intentions of the interveners. Rosenau writes:

> [An] ...important advantage of the basis for operationalizing intervention outlined above is that it obviates the enormously difficult task of tracing motivation. In this formulation, neither the underlying goals of the intervening actor nor the attitudes of those in the intervened society need to be probed in order to determine the existence of interventionary phenomena. Under the best of circumstances goals and attitudes can be inferred from observed behaviors only crudely, and interventions hardly constitute the best conditions for deriving motivational inferences. To be faced— as many students of international law consider they are—with the task of inferring whether the targets of the action actually felt coerced is to take on a staggering, if not impossible, assignment. As developed above, however, such problems do not arise at the definitional level. Whatever the purposes of the intervener and whatever the feelings of the intervened, an intervention exists when the former makes a sharp break with the prevailing manner of relating to the latter and directs behavior at the latter's structure of authority. The analyst may want to probe the motives and attitudes of the parties to an intervention in order to evaluate its success, but the foregoing formulation has the advantage of not requiring him to do so merely in order to identify the phenomena of interest.[132]

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[132] Ibid, p.164.

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Although the motivation of the interveners in the case study of the Iranian Revolution under evaluation is excluded in accordance with Rosenau's operational definition of the concept of intervention, the available perspective of the intervened old regime is included in this study because of its analytical and historical values.

Stanley Hoffman also defines international intervention, but states that it includes "acts which try to affect not the external activities, but the domestic affairs of a state."[133] This definition is also relevant to the study of revolution and international intervention because state and non-state actors in part intervene in the domestic affairs of the pre-revolutionary state to bring about changes in favor of their particular, though not necessarily collective, desired goals.

Hoffman writes that international intervention includes "acts aimed at the domestic affairs of the state"[134], his comprehensive definition also covers the targeted state's foreign policy. For, as he writes, "an attempt at affecting domestic affairs is deemed the best way of influencing the external behaviour of a state..."[135]. This definition is relevant to the study of state or non-state actors whose motive in intervening in revolution is to bring about changes in certain foreign policies of a state, policies which the sovereign pre-revolutionary state

[133] Stanley Hoffmann, "The Problem of Intervention", in Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 10.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid, pp.10-11.

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does not want to implement. In the Iranian Revolution, this was the aim of the Soviet Union in balancing the United States.

Hoffman thus elaborates on the types of actors:

> A...means of delimitation is by reference to the type of actors. The word has been used so loosely that one sometimes talks about intervention by private groups. I prefer to limit consideration of it to acts of states, of groups fighting for statehood, and of collection of states, such as international organizations. In other words, I include as examples of intervention the activities of private organizations, like multinational corporations, for instance, only if they are backed by a state, or act on behalf of a state.[136]

Anarchy and Sovereignty

Due to anarchy, the absence of a central authority in the international system to enforce rules among states, states as rational actors rely on self-help and alliances to maximize their interests.

Since the Congress of Vienna, a principal rule of international politics has been state sovereignty. Sovereignty, as a right of state in international law, holds that states are sovereign entities in control of their domestic affairs under the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction. In international relations theory, it means, "states are separate, are autonomous, and answer to no higher authority (due to anarchy). In principle, all states are equal in status if not in power. Sovereignty also means that states are not supposed to interfere in the internal affairs of

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[136] Ibid, p.10.

other states."[137] In international law, the principle of non-intervention is reinforced by the two related principles of recognition and domestic jurisdiction.

Sovereignty, International Intervention and Morality

Since the Congress of Vienna, the international state system has been based on the doctrine of sovereignty. Due to the anarchic structure of the international system, in which there is no central authority, states are sovereign entities in control of their domestic affairs under the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction. Yet, sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction are not absolute.[138] The justification for intervention in a sovereign state, according to Professor Leonard Binder, is not specified under international law. In The Moral Foundation of International Intervention, Professor Binder writes:

> International law, especially as it has been modified by the Charter of the United Nations, is grounded on actual or hypothetical agreements among sovereign states. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, and related agreements, set a standard of human rights to be observed by sovereign states. Neither the charter nor the declaration specify under what circumstances human rights violations may justify intervention and contravention of the rule of sovereignty.[139]

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[137] Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations, Third Edition. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 1999), p.77.
[138] Stanley Hoffmann, "The Problem of Intervention", p. 26.
[139] Leonard Binder, The Moral Foundation of International Intervention (La Jolla, CA.: University Press of California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1996), p. 5.

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Professor Binder adds that despite the contradiction between sovereignty and international intervention, there may exist a moral foundation for intervention in international law:

> Despite the potential conflict between these two standards on international behavior, there is a widespread and common belief that a broad range of human rights are based on international law, and that international law is based on the foundation of universally recognized principles of morality.[140]

There are two schools of thought which deal with the issue of morality and international intervention. As distinguished by Professor Binder, they are "Rights-Based Theories" and "Needs-Based Theories of Rights". Both schools discuss when international intervention is justified and when it is not.

"Rights-Based Theories"

Michael Walzer has categorized theories of intervention in the context of international law as "the legalist paradigm".[141] Following John Stuart Mill, he states that states (political communities) have the right to self-determination, as do individuals. Nevertheless, he indicates three exceptions, that is three circumstances under which international intervention is justified, what he terms as "rules of disregard". These

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[140] Ibid.
[141] Cited in ibid, p.8.

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exceptions are: 1) secession or national liberation, 2) counter-intervention, and 3) enslavement, massacre, and massive expulsion.[142]

"Needs-Based Theories of Rights"

As stated by Professor Binder, Raymond Plant's theory sets forth what he considers to be "a universally understandable and applicable basis for determining when intervention is morally justifiable."[143]

> One can accept all the differences between cultures and argue that nevertheless there is some non-culturally specific account of basic needs. These are necessary for acting in accordance with the values of any culture, whatever its values might turn out to be. Those needs would be survival and autonomy."[144]

Sovereignty vs. Self-Help

Sovereignty and self-help are contradictory. According to Hoffmann:

> There are, in international affairs, some fundamental contradictions which underlie the whole subject of intervention. The most fundamental is this. International society, for some centuries now, has been founded on the principle of sovereignty; in other words, the state is supposed to be the master of what goes on inside its territory, and international relations are relations between sovereign states, each one of which has certain rights and obligations derived from the very fact of statehood. If one accepts the principle of sovereignty as the corner-stone of international

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[142] Michel Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p.90. The third element in the third category (massive expulsion) is included in Walzer's subsequent article. Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics", Philosophy & Public Affairs, Volume 9, Number 3, Spring 1980, pp. 217-218.
[143] Leonard Binder, The Moral Foundation of International Intervention, p. 13.
[144] Raymond Plant cited in Leonard Binder, The Moral Foundation of International Intervention, p. 13.

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society, this means...that intervention, defined as an act aimed at influencing the domestic affairs of a state, is quite clearly illegitimate. On the other hand, the principle of sovereignty also entails the rule of self-help, and there is an innate contradiction between the illegitimacy of intervention and the legitimacy of self-help.[145]

Intervention to Promote Democracy v. Sovereignty, Recognition and Domestic Jurisdiction

Sovereignty and international intervention to promote democracy are also contradictory. In its enforcement vis-à-vis non-democratic states, it is contradictory because of the domestic aspect of the doctrine of recognition as the right of states in control of their territories and nationals and their authority over the two as being in their domestic jurisdiction. Nevertheless, international intervention to promote democracy is one of the areas which is indicative that sovereignty is not absolute because the duties of being a state in part depends on its treatment of its own nationals. Walzer's exceptions to non-intervention in cases of genocide and starvation are examples which indicates that sovereignty is not absolute and depends on the manner in which the sovereign state behaves nationally and internationally. Another example is the lack in undemocratic countries of what in the United States' constitution are the First Amendment rights.

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[145] Stanley Hoffmann, "The Problem of Intervention", in Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 11

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International Intervention for Democracy

There are disagreements among scholars about the justifiability of international intervention to promote democracy. Hoffman writes that in the literature on international intervention, there is agreement on humanitarian intervention, interpreted as Walzer's exceptions to non-intervention (genocide and starvation).[146] However, he writes that there is disagreement on democracy as justified intervention. Walzer "adopts J.S. Mill's argument, namely that it is legitimate to intervene for self-determination, but not in order to establish democracy."[147]

Walzer has stated that international intervention to promote democracy is unjustified because of what he calls as the "right of revolution" by the people of undemocratic states as opposed to external intervention to promote democracy by the international community.[148]

> For revolutionary activity is an exercise in self-determination, while foreign interference denies to a people those political capabilities that only such exercise can bring.[149]

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[146] Stanley Hoffmann, "The Problem of Intervention", p.24.
[147] Ibid, p.25.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Cited in Leonard Binder, The Moral Foundation of International Intervention, p.30,n.

As stated by Hoffmann, Walzer's critics "have pointed out that modern governments have formidable means of repression, so that one cannot always wrest freedom for oneself without outside aid; moreover, the right of a state to be protected from outside intervention is ultimately based on the domestic nature of the state—on the presumed fit between the government and the governed."[150]

Political Consequences of Intervention

Professor Leonard Binder has introduced and analyzed significant aspects of international intervention including the lack of an effective and consistent policy, and the political consequences of international intervention.

He states that in order to ensure the effectiveness and consistency of international intervention, the United States as the leader of the democratic world, ought to "articulate a general political ethic and then apply it to the policy issues confronting the country."[151] Professor Leonard Binder writes:

> International moralists tell us that we should feed the starving; provide government where it is absent; strengthen democratic consensus; and respect ethnic and religious claims to political sovereignty. We are also told to avoid interfering except where there is compelling moral justification. And we are told to limit our intervention to our means and resources; to minimize the use of

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[150] Stanley Hoffmann, "The Problem of Revolution", p.26.
[151] Leonard Binder, The Moral Foundation of International Intervention, p.6.

force; and to maximize the political neutrality of our efforts in order to maintain the political autonomy of the target population. But we are not told how we can reconcile all of these requirements, nor which to sacrifice in particular cases. Instead, the moral responsibility for the political consequences of intervention has gone unanticipated and unrecognized. A deeper understanding of moral responsibility demands that it is as important to coordinate our moral means and ends as it is to make sound prudential determinations of military costs and benefits—and that the difference between the two is not as great as some have thought.[152]

Types of Interveners

In the literature on international intervention, what are relevant are the acts of state actors. Yet, non-state actors may also intervene in the domestic politics of sovereign states.

Vincent refers to three general intervener actors: states, revolutionary groups within a given country, and "regional and universal international organizations".[153]

Types of Revolutionary Intervention

There are three distinct types of revolutionary intervention: 1) directly weakening the state, 2) directly reinforcing the domestic forces/opposition, and 3) directly weakening the state and indirectly reinforcing the domestic forces.

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[152] Ibid.
[153] R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974),pp.4-5.

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Summary

Polarity, polar actors, sub-system regional actors, alliances, and intervention by both state actors and non-state actors may have an impact on the success or failure of a revolution. Polarity determines the "interaction opportunity" open to the pre-revolutionary state including alliances at the system and sub-system levels.

Alliances at the system level as well as alliances at the subsystem level may contribute to the success or failure of revolution. Actors at both levels may exert influence on revolution including through intervention.

There are three types of revolutionary intervention: 1) directly weakening the state, 2) directly reinforcing the opposition, and 3) directly weakening the state and indirectly reinforcing the opposition. The sovereignty of the pre-revolutionary state including its domestic jurisdiction may be undermined by international intervention. Humanitarian international intervention is justified. International intervention for democracy is controversial, but justified. But, the justifiability of international intervention to change the foreign policy of a state which respects and observes the norms and principles of international law, is questionable.

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Both state actors and non-state actors may have an influence on revolution. At the system level, polar actors may be contributory factors in revolution. The polar actors may intervene directly or indirectly to weaken the pre-revolutionary state and/or to reinforce the revolutionaries. Polar actors also may influence revolutions through their direct or indirect influence with their regional allies in the subsystem in which the pre-revolutionary state is located.

At the subsystem level, the regional actors, whether with or without the assistance of their polar allies, may also contribute to the success of revolution.

Non-state actors may also exert influence on revolution. For example, International Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) such as International Financial Institutions have been causal factors in revolution. The IMF's impact on revolution is due to the impact of the IMF conditionality agreements, and the IMF structural adjustment program. The implementation of these policies by the state borrower may contribute to sociopolitical unrest, and revolution.

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Part Two

State Actors:

The Cold War Bipolar Actors at the System Level

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Introduction

The Cold War System and the Middle East system of International Relations

The Iranian Revolution was an integral part of both the Cold War system and the Regional Middle East system of international relations. In the Cold War system, established in the aftermath of the Second World War, the bipolar actors established their respective spheres of influence and alliances to preserve and strengthen their interests globally. These included the Marshall Plan, NATO, CENTO and the Warsaw Pact in the European system and the Regional Middle East system. The bipolar actors at times intervened in their spheres of influence: e.g., the United States in Latin America, and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union's policy was an expansionist policy for geopolitical and geoeconomic influence in the international state system. The Containment Policy was an integral part of American foreign policy in the Cold War, and was implemented globally.

The Middle East system was not an exception. Both bipolar actors had their respective alliances in the region, and intervened in that region. The Soviet Union continued its expansionist policies, and the United States followed its Containment policy.

The Iranian Revolution occurred during the Cold War. Iran was in the United States' sphere of influence. It was a member of the CENTO

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alliance, and a geopolitical ally of the United States. The Soviet Union competed with the United States for influence in Iran. The United State's Containment policy limited the Soviet Union's expansionist policy toward Iran.

The bipolar actors at the system level had their own state allies in the Middle East system. Iran, Israel,Turkey, and the moderate Arab states were allies of the United States. The radical Arab states and organizations were a part of the Soviet regional alliance in the Middle East system.

Superpowers and Revolution

The literature on superpowers and revolution—more specifically on superpowers as causal factors in revolution (Skocpol, Goldfrank and Goldstone)—has contributed to our understanding of the causes of revolution.[154] Theda Skocpol's theory holds that pre-revolutionary states are located in a disadvantaged position in the international system.[155] Walter L. Goldfrank's theory states that lack of support by a major power preoccupied with international or domestic issues, and an "antagonistic" balance of power between major powers are among the causes of

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[154] For the detailed analysis of these theories refer to Chapter Two.
[155] Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p.23.

revolution. Jack A. Goldstone's theory posits that "overdependence" on a superpower, "overidentification" with a superpower, and imposition of domestic policies by a superpower weakens the pre-revolutionary state, more specifically, neopatrimonial states.

At the System Level: Bipolar Actors and the Iranian Revolution

The role of the United States, specifically the impact of the Carter Administration's policy of human rights, is explored in Chapter Four.

One aspect of Iran's ties during the revolution with the other Cold War superpower, the Soviet Union, has been examined by Carol R. Savietz.[156] Savietz analyzes why the Soviet Union did not engage in direct military intervention in Iran during the revolution. Among other factors, Savietz believes that from the Soviets' perspective, the "local environment" was not conducive to intervention. She states:

> The situations in which the Soviets have intervened cooperatively or by themselves are cases where the survival of Communist or quasi-Communist regimes have been in question. In the Third World context, the category of regimes might well be extended to include 'socialist oriented' states. As the USSR ha[d] demonstrated both in Eastern Europe and the Third World, intervention occurred to preserve loyal regimes: In many cases, the Soviet arrogated to themselves the intervention decision (the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine) while in others they ostensibly provided military aid by request and invitation...Iran in 1979 presented neither an example of a threatened Communist regime, nor a 'host' to invite in the Soviet troops.[157]

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[156] Carol R. Savietz, "The USSR and Khomeini's Revolution" in Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., Superpowers and Revolution , pp. 224-240.
[157] Ibid, p.228.

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Did the Soviet Union intervene in Iran (non-militarily) prior to or during the revolution? The Soviet Union's influence in the Iranian Revolution is analyzed in Chapter Five. An interpretation of the declassified documents, discussed and analyzed in Chapter Five, is that the Soviet Union intervened in the Iranian Revolution by weakening the pre-revolutionary state and reinforcing the domestic forces. Also, the Soviet Union's sponsorship of radical Arab states, including the supply of Soviet arms was an indirect intervention contributing to the success of the revolution.

The Middle East Sub-system: Regional Actors

Applying Professor Leonard Binder's theory of "subordinate international systems", specifically "the Middle East Subsystem" [158], to the Iranian Revolution, this subordinate system is the context of the Shah's regime's ties with the regional powers/actors, which in addition to polar actors were also causal factors in the revolution. In this context, what is known about the role of the Soviet Union is that a number of regional state actors and non-state actors—the radical Arab states, and Palestinian organizations—were financially and militarily supported by

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[158] Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System", World Politics, Volume X, Number 3, April 1958, pp.408-429.

the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Therefore, the Soviet Union, in addition to intervening by weakening the old regime and reinforcing the domestic forces (Chapter Five), also had an indirect role in the Iranian Revolution by supporting the radical Arab forces which intervened prior to and during the Iranian Revolution by strengthening the revolutionaries.

Regional Alliances at the System Level

The concept of international alliances as employed in this dissertation is the application of Stephen M. Walt's definition of alliance as "a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states."[159] As stated by Walt, this definition is applicable even in cases where there does not exist a document or a treaty between states:

> ...precise distinctions—for example, between formal and informal alliances—would probably distort more than they would reveal. There has never been a formal treaty of alliance between the United States and Israel, but no one would question the level of commitment between these two states. Changes in that commitment, moreover, have been revealed primarily by changes in behavior or by verbal statements, not by the rewriting of a document. Similarly, the Soviet Union and Egypt did not sign a formal treaty until 1971 but were obviously close allies long before then. And the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was actually a sign of growing tension between the two countries, not a symbol of enhanced commitment.[160]

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[159] Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 12.
[160] Ibid.

The cold war alliances in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) at the international system level, as they relate to the study of the Iranian Revolution, were as follows: the three non-Arab states (Israel, Iran, and Turkey) were allies of the United States; in addition, Saudi Arabia and Egypt (under Sadat) were the moderate Arab states in this alliance; the radical Arab states including Iraq, Libya, Syria and Palestinian Organizations were allies of the Soviet Union.

The Foreign Policy of the Old Regime

Iran's Foreign Policy, the Cold War System and the Regional Middle East System

Iran's foreign policy during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi affected and was affected by both the Cold War bipolar system including their respective blocs, and subsystems. This section is a brief summary of the core of the old regime's foreign policy objectives and behavior in the overall context of the Cold War system and the Middle East system.

Iran's Foreign Policy and the Bipolar System

Iran's foreign policy from the accession of the Shah to the throne until the overthrow of his regime was a consistent alliance with the

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United States. The alliance was always strong, but the relations were closest during the Nixon Administration. There are arguments in favor of the statement that the Shah was the puppet of the United States. Just as there are arguments that the Shah was too independent of foreign powers.

The foreign relations of the Shah's regime with the other Cold War superpower and its bloc after the early 1970's was not an alliance, but there were interstate relations. Iran normalized its relations with the Soviet Union, established diplomatic relations with China in 1971 with the mediation of Pakistan, and in 1978 had scheduled and later postponed a diplomatic mission to be led by the Shah to Eastern Europe—never materialized due to the emergence of the revolutionary situation in Iran.

Iran's Oil Policy, the Cold War System and the Regional Middle East System

Iran's role in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has been termed hawkish. The Shah was known as the hawk of OPEC due to his oil policy of leading large increases in 1970's in the price of oil. In 1973, for example, the OPEC quadrupled the price of per barrel of petroleum. The regime's oil policy and that of the OPEC had adverse consequences for the international community, both the

Industrial countries of the Free World and the non-OPEC developing countries.

Iran's Regional Policy

After the withdrawal of Britain from the Persian Gulf in 1971, Iran, as a regional polar actor became what is referred to as the Policeman of the Persian Gulf. As a subordinate regional ally of the United States, a member of CENTO, and a bordering neighbor to the Soviet Union, Iran's foreign policy goal was to block Cold War Soviet influence and expansion in the Middle East. Within the Middle East system, Iran had a policy of alliance with the non-Arab states (Israel and Turkey) known as the Periphery Pact,[161] and later concomitant improvement of relations with the Arab state[162], and played a role in advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process.

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[161] Refer to Sohrab Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988 (New York, Praeger, 1989).
[162] Ibid.

Chapter 4

At the System Level: The Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy and the Revolution

> "In Iran our human rights policy
> has contributed to instability"
> Dr. Henry Kissinger[163]

According to Richard B. Bilder, international human rights law is enforced or implemented on three 'levels': "through action: (1) within the national system of the state concerned; (2) by other states in the course of international relations; or (3) by international bodies."[164] The latter two "levels" of enforcement are relevant to the study of international influences in the Iranian Revolution. Carter and Trimble also note a fourth level of enforcement, i.e. by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). In the Iranian Revolution, human rights advocacy of the International Court of Jurists, as an International Governmental Organization (IGO), falls under the third category. And the human rights advocacy of Amnesty International, as an NGO, falls under the fourth category.

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[163] The Economist, February 10, 1979, p.32. Reference to Henry Kissinger's interview with the Economist is cited in Farzeen Nasri, "Iranian Studies and the Iranian Revolution", World Politics, Vol.35, No.4, July 1983, pp. 607-630.

[164] Richard B. Bilder, "An Overview of International Human Rights Law", Hurst Hannum, ed., Guide to International Human Rights Practices, Second Edition, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), in Barry E. Carter and Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, Third Edition (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 1999) p. 850.

This chapter analyzes the second level, that is, the enforcement/implementation of international human rights law by other states in the international system. On this level, termed the "interstate level" by Bilder, "one nation may complain directly to another nation concerning that nation's alleged breach of human rights obligations and can bring formal and informal diplomatic pressure to bear in an attempt to influence the other nation to cease such violations. The United States, for example, has employed 'quiet diplomacy,' public criticism, and denial of military and economic assistance in attempts to persuade other nations to conform to their international human rights obligations." [165]

The Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy had an impact on the ancien régime. The diplomatic pressure to promote human rights and democracy and the old regime's responsive measure, the adoption of the policy of Political Liberalization, had an impact on the Iranian Revolution. This chapter analyzes the following questions: What was the effect of the debate within the Carter Administration on the old regime? How did the Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy weaken the Shah's regime? What was the response of the old regime to the diplomatic pressure for human rights and democracy? What were the cause(s) of the defeat of the Iranian liberals?

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[165] Ibid.

The Policy of Human Rights

Human rights was an issue in the 1976 presidential campaigns, and the Democratic Party campaigned for the advancement of international human rights, as one of the main tenets of U.S. foreign policy in the subsequent administration. The second Ford-Carter presidential debate (October 6, 1976) included issues of international politics and foreign policy[166], in which human rights was mentioned several times. Carter criticized arms sales and termed the United States the "arms merchant of the world".[167] Arms sales to Iran was an issue in this debate.

After the presidential elections, human rights became an integral part of the Carter Administration's foreign policy directed against authoritarian regimes.

The Debate within the Carter Administration

There was a debate in the Carter Administration regarding the Iranian revolution. President Carter and three other people were the main players in this crisis. There was a debate between Cyrus Vance (the Secretary of State) and Zbigniew Brzezinski (the National Security

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[166] The transcript of this debate is provided in Sidney Kraus,ed., The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford, 1976. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 476-497.
[167] Ibid, p.483.

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Advisor). Vance interpreted the national interest as the removal of the Shah from power, while Brzezinski supported the continuation of the Shah's regime. There was also a debate among Carter and Vance, Brzezinski, and Ambassador William Sullivan regarding the course of action that the United States should take regarding the upheavals in Iran. After the revolution, they have each written about the debate.[168] What is certain is that US national interests have been damaged by the removal of the Shah from power.

One of the results of the debate within the Carter Administration regarding the crisis in Iran was that the channels of communication between Washington and Tehran were not clear. Ardeshir Zahedi, Iran's Ambassador to the United States during the revolution, in the following interview, thus views the Carter Administration's policy regarding Iran:

> In our meetings which lasted for several hours in the White House, Carter always reassured me of his support and asked me to tell His Majesty that we are a hundred percent behind you. However, this [Carter Administration's foreign policy] was a haphazard policy. Today, they would do one thing and tomorrow another. The Secretary of State had one thing to say and the President another. And, his Ambassador expressed another view. We should not have committed ourselves to foreign policy to the extent that we did. We had a [foreign] policy called National Independent Policy. We should have acted according to what the interests of our country

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[168] See Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp.433-458.; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy. (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1983), pp.314-348.; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981. (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux , 1983), pp. 354-398.,and William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981).

dictated—whether foreigners were pleased with that policy or not.[169]

Weakening of the State: As Viewed by the Political Leadership

Dr. Manouchehr Ganji, the Minister of Education during the revolution, states that the Carter Administration's criticism of Iran's human rights record weakened the regime and contributed to the fall of the regime:

> Certainly it helped in de-stabilization of the Shah's regime. There is no question about it. In spite of the fact that he came to Tehran, and in January before the revolution he toasted the Shah, and he called Iran as the Island of Stability in a troubled world, the fact that so much was said about the prevailing conditions in Iran, it certainly boosted the moral of the people who were opposing the regime, and it brought them into public attention. Many people had come to the conclusion that the U.S. was supportive of the National Front and those who were against the regime. And, in fact, the activities of the opposition gained momentum during that period. International support for forces that want to overthrow and or change a regime, especially the support of the United States is a very important factor...The fact that Carter, before the election even, during the campaign, took that stand and followed it through, it certainly helped the opposition to the regime. [170]

Domestic Forces and the Revolutionary Situation

The human rights policy and the Administration's criticism of the Shah's regime had an impact on the revolution. Even though there was a

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[169] Manouchehr Bibiyan's interview with Ardeshir Zahedi, the Shah's regime's last Ambassador to the United States. JAAM-E-JAM Television (U.S.A.). Location of the interview: Switzerland. Broadcast Date: May 1994. Translated from Persian.
[170] Author's interview with Dr. Manouchehr Ganji, Iran's Minister of Education (1976-1978) in Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's regime, April 21, 1996.

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debate in the Carter Administration regarding the Shah's regime, the domestic forces interpreted the Administration's human rights policy as a break in U.S.-Iran relations. The domestic forces renewed their open political activities. Mehdi Bazargan, who after the revolution became the Islamic Republic's first Prime Minister, stated in an interview with The New York Times that the opposition, including himself would not have taken the Shah's Liberalization policy seriously had there not been pressure by the Carter Administration on the regime. He stated: "when Carter's human rights drive lifted the hope of the people, all the built-up pressure exploded."[171]

Domestic Factor: Political Underdevelopment

Theories of democracy in less-developed countries concentrate on theories of political development. Iran's political system remained underdeveloped under the old regime. The period following WWII until the overthrow of Prime Minister Mussadiq was marked by unprecedented political participation. However, subsequent to the overthrow of the Mussadiq government in 1953 until the 1979 revolution although the Shah followed a development strategy contributing to socio-economic development, the political system nevertheless remained underdeveloped.

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[171] The New York Times Magazine , December 17, 1978, cited in Sepehr Zabih, Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval (San Francisco: Alchemy Books, 1979) cited in Henry Munson, Jr., Islam and Revolution in the Middle East (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1988), p.58.

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In the 1950's there existed only two political parties in Iran. One was the state's party, the Melliyun Party, the other was an opposition party, the Mardum Party. Neither one provided for genuine political participation. Immediately before the 1975 elections, the political development of Iran experienced a further set-back by the establishment of a one party system by the government, named the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party.

State's Responsiveness

The response of the Shah's regime to the Carter Administration's human rights policy abroad was the Policy of Political Liberalization.

Under the "National Reconciliation" government of Sharif-Emami, the ban on all political parties, whether old or new, was lifted, but it was too late. The National Front and eleven other political parties announced their return to Iran's politics. These parties included the Freedom Movement, the Laborers Party, the Pan-Iranist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Association for the Protection of the Constitution, the Association of the Nationalists, the Islamic Liberal Party, and the Democratic Party of Iran.[172]

In addition to granting freedom of all political parties and associations, after twenty-four years of censorship of the press, the

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[172] Kayhan International, August 29, 1978.

government lifted censorship of the press. It permitted the publication of old and new newspapers and magazines. The press, including the National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT), was declared free from censorship. The printed press published pictures of Khomeini on the cover page and began reporting the riots, demonstrations and casualties. The broadcast media aired the debates of the Majlis (parliament) for the first time, airing some members of Congress' attack on the regime.[173]

Concessions were also made to the Iranian opposition abroad. In a communiqué addressed to Iranians abroad, the government amnestied the opposition, guaranteeing that upon their return, they would not be persecuted. The Minister of State for Executive Affairs, Manuchehr Azmun, stated that amnesty applied to all political groups "no matter what their ideology or political stand might be." [174] The consequence of this was that the Iranian dissidents whether oppositional leaders living abroad or their followers, returned to Iran to organize and lead the revolutionary activities. Although liberals were among these dissidents, the majority consisted of leaders and members of the Marxist-Leninist Fidayan-i-Khalq, the Islamic-"Marxist" Mujahidin-i-Khalq, and Islamic extremists. Upon their return to Iran, the latter three groups joined the domestic opposition and they renewed their violence against the regime.

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[173] For a detailed account of the concessions to the opposition, and other exogenous pressures for political liberalization, refer to Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions , pp. 496-529 Passim.
[174] Kayhan International, October 2, 1978.

The Defeat of the Liberals

The liberals' , including the <u>Jibhi-i-Melli's</u> (National Front), participation in Iran's political system was the objective of the liberal opponents of the Shah in the United States. It was also the oppositional group to which the political liberalization was directed because they constituted the democratic forces, and because the Shah's objective was to preserve the constitutional monarchy. Most liberals, following Mussadiq, did not oppose a constitutional monarchy in which the Shah would reign but not rule.

The liberals lost the revolutionary struggle for democracy. The liberal's lack of political base was the predominant factor in their defeat. They lacked a political base because after their overthrow due to the CIA-backed 1953 Coup, they were unable to organize, campaign, and develop a political base. Prior to the coup, Mohammad Reza Shah from his accession to the throne until the coup was a constitutional monarch. The National Front was the most powerful force in the politics of Iran. It was the ruling party in the administration of Mohammad Mussadiq, the leader of the National Front. It had the support of the majority of the Iranian people. The National Front was not the only active political party in that period; all political parties including the Tudeh (Communist Party) actively participated in the political system.

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This period came to an end because of the Free World's Cold War international intervention. It was not until two decades later when the revolutionary situation emerged, that the liberals began to organize once again.

According to Ervand Abrahamian, in the period subsequent to the fall of Mussadiq the movement of the liberals, i.e. those elements who sought to establish a liberal democracy in Iran, was organized under the Second National Front.[175] Sussan Siavoshi, in her study of liberal nationalism in Iran, partly through the application of Charles Tilly's political conflict theory, argues that the movement's failure may be attributed to the following factors[176]: 1) lack of concrete goals contributing to "the mobilization incompetence of the movement" 2) low degree of organization 3) lack of resources for mobilization 4) negative economic and demographic structural factors such as "the autonomy of the rentier state [which] created structural barriers for an effective challenge on the part of the liberal nationalist movement" 5)cultural and ideological factors such as the "politicization of Islam and the radicalization and militantization of the intelligentsia", and 7) the negative impact of international structure and ideological developments in the Cold War.

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[175] According to Ervand Abrahamian, the liberals of the Second National Front, "call[ed] for the establishment of a secular democratic state in Iran". Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 461.

[176] Sussan Siavoshi, Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 6-12.

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Yet another factor which also contributed to the defeat of the liberals in Iran in the revolution and its aftermath was their strategy. Freedom of political participation, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, even the dissolution of the intelligence service and a proposed national election promised by the Shah so that a representative government could come to power, were considered inadequate by the liberals. Rather, most of them made an alliance with the clerics, the Islamic extremists. They state that this alliance was forged to assume the political leadership after the revolution. In this way, the liberals contributed to the latter's seizure of power, and their own destruction as well as the old regime.

As part of their strategy, the liberals refused to join the government. From the mid-revolutionary period onwards, the Shah asked the National Front to form a government. They refused. The issue involved the departure of the Shah. Some liberals demanded that the Shah remain in Iran, and other liberals like Shapour Bakhtiar asked that he leave the country. Bakhtiar's acceptance of the position of Prime Minister was conditional on the Shah's departure from Iran, and the Shah's agreement on this issue once again brought a liberal administration to power, but an administration in which not all liberals joined.

Shapour Bakhtiar, a top leader of the National Front, who had also served in the Mussadiq cabinet, accepted this position and formed a

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government because he had a different strategy. He believed that the establishment of a liberal government might defeat the undemocratic forces in the revolutionary struggle. In his own words, three years after the revolution:

> Subsequent to the fall of Dr. Mussadiq, every opportunity was open to me to serve in all political positions that I desired. I was educated...and my family had influence. But, I refused. If, twenty-five years later, after much hardship, I accepted to become prime minister, it was to save the country, not just to save a regime which ruled in that manner. Rather, to prevent the coming to power of a regime [with the consequences] I had predicted... I was a responsible prime minister and accepted this responsibility in accordance with the Constitution. My measures were unlike those who called themselves prime minister, but were in fact office managers implementing the Shah's commands... The reason I accepted the position of premiership was to save Iran, so that it would not result in the present situation. Had the regime chosen to appoint me three months earlier, that is in place of Sharif-Emami, the Iranian opposition [to the Islamic Republic] in exile would have been in Iran, and Khomeini would not have [succeeded]...[177]

After the Revolution, Shapour Bakhtiar became the leader of an oppositional group, National Resistance Movement, in exile. He was assassinated in his residence in Surrense, a suburb of Paris, in 1991.

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[177] JAAM-E-JAM Television's interview with Shapour Bakhtiar,the old regime's last Prime Minister, May 1982. Translated from Persian.

Iranian Studies on the Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy and the Revolution

In a review article, Farzeen Nasri[178] has analyzed writings on the impact of the Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy on the revolution. Nasri's analysis of these studies concentrate on two aspects of this policy: 1) "whether the Carter Administration actually forced the Shah into liberalizing his policies", and 2) "whether President Carter's human rights program contributed to the Shah's downfall". He concludes that there is disagreement on the first issue but unanimity on the second.

Among the earliest works which have analyzed the Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy and the Iranian Revolution, more specifically the works that have been principally written on the Iranian Revolution (as opposed to U.S. Foreign Policy), are those by Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi and Henry Munson, Jr.[179]

Ashraf and Banuazizi state that in the Iranian Revolution, "external pressures—whether real or perceived—also played a significant role by undermining the self-confidence of the regime to deal effectively with its opponents as well as creating the 'opportunity' for the opposition to

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[178] Farzeen Nasri, "Iranian Studies and the Iranian Revolution", World Politics, Vol.35, No.4, July 1983, pp. 607-630.

[179] Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, "The State, Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution", State, Culture and Society, Vol. I, Number 3, Spring 1985, pp.3-40.; Henry Munson, Jr., Islam and Revolution in the Middle East (New haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

mobilize the masses."[180] Ashraf and Banuazizi's premise that "external pressures interact with internal opposition" is one of their contributions to the study of the Iranian Revolution. They state:

> In our view of the events of the first stage of the revolution...the election of a liberal Democrat as President of the United States in 1976 caught the Shah by surprise and made him apprehensive about the future of American support for his regime. Whether or not any real policy change towards Iran was being contemplated in Washington is not the issue. What mattered was the Shah's perception that the United States would ask him to implement policies which would seriously jeopardize his hold on power.[181]

Munson has a similar hypothesis:

> ...the most important precipitating cause of the Iranian Revolution was the Carter administration's human rights policy, or more specifically, the Iranian perception of that policy.[182]

The Shah's psychology, and his perception and the perceptions of Iranians regarding the human rights policy were factors in the revolution. Another relevant factor in international relations is the bilateral U.S.-Iran relations.

Dr. Henry Kissinger on the Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy and the Iranian Revolution

Did the Carter Administration support the Shah's regime, or the opponents to his regime? Did that support, or lack thereof, translate as a

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[180] Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, "The State, Classes and Modes of Mobilization", p. 18.
[181] Ibid, p.19.
[182] Henry Munson, Jr., Islam and Revolution in the Middle East, p. 126.

cause of the revolution? The answer is complicated. Throughout the revolutionary period, the Administration officially expressed support for the regime of the Shah. The New York Times articles and transcripts during that period are documentation of that support.[183] For example, in a news conference, President Carter stated: "The Shah has our support and he also has our confidence."[184] Yet, concomitantly, as stated earlier, there was a debate within the administration on this issue.

If the Administration supported the regime throughout the period of the revolution, then why was its policy vis-à-vis Iran a causal factor in the revolution? Dr. Henry Kissinger has illuminated the issue and has resolved the dilemma. Dr. Kissinger states:

> Our statements of support had no practical consequence and their operational content always had a caveat that in fact tended to encourage those who were fomenting unrest.[185]

Other than the debate within the Administration which weakened the political leadership of the old regime, the old regime was weakened by what Dr.Kissinger has referred to as the "operational content" of the Administration's policy:

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[183] Refer to The New York Times, "Transcript of President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters", December 13, 1978; "Carter Issues Plea to Khomeini to Give Iran Chief a Chance", January 18, 1979 . As this article indicates, on January 17, 1979, President Carter expressed the United States' support for Prime Minister Bakhtiar's government.
[184] The New York Times, December 13, 1978.
[185] The Economist, February 10, 1979, "Kissinger's Critique", Part II, (pp.31-36), p.32.

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When we said we supported the Shah it was stated as a general objective. When we put forward concrete propositions, however, we advocated such measures as coalition government and general liberalization. Such propositions tempted the Shah, in order to maintain our support, into directions which exacerbated his problems.

The fundamental challenge of a revolution is this: certainly wise governments forestall revolutions by making timely concessions; indeed the very wisest governments do not consider adaptations as concessions, but rather as part of a natural process of increasing popular support. However, once a revolution is in train it cannot then be moderated by concessions. Once a revolution has occurred, the pre-eminent requirement is the restoration of authority. These concessions, which had they been taken a year earlier might have avoided the situation, accelerated the process of disintegration. After authority is restored there is another opportunity to make concessions.

When friends of the United States are under duress, we cannot take the curse off the necessity of that friendship by force-feeding an internal programme that would have been very wise and farsighted if it had been undertaken voluntarily two years earlier, or that could again be very farsighted six months later. If we attempt to take the curse off our geopolitical necessities by placating our human rights advocates in the middle of the crisis we make a catastrophe inevitable. Ideally a country should avoid revolutions by making timely concessions. I wish that had happened in Iran, but since it did not happen the situation could not be rectified by frantic concessions in the very middle of a revolution.[186]

Summary

The Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy and the Shah's regime's responsiveness (Policy of Liberalization) were contributory factors in the Iranian Revolution. As stated by Dr. Henry Kissinger, the concomitant statements of support by the Administration were inconsequential and the "operational content" of the Administration's

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[186] Ibid.

policy—that is, imposing an "internal programme"—undertaken by the Shah's regime involuntarily and implemented in an untimely manner, contributed to the success of the revolution.[187]

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[187] Henry Kissinger's interview with The Economist,, "Kissinger's Critique" p.32.

Chapter 5

At the System level: The Soviet Union and the Iranian Revolution

The previous chapter analyzed the impact of the United States on the Iranian Revolution. This chapter analyzes the impact of the other Cold War polar actor on the revolution: the Soviet Union. The information available on the Soviet Union's intervention in the revolution is the Central Intelligence Agency's declassified documents as related to Soviet foreign policy regarding Iran. One reason for the declassification of Soviet documents is perhaps the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. Yet, despite this transformation in international politics, even these reports are blackened-out and incomplete. This chapter relies on information provided in one report named "Soviet Involvement in the Iranian Crisis"[188] (hereafter referred to as the report).

This chapter answers the following questions: What was the Soviet Union's policy prior to and in the course of the Iranian Revolution? What were the Soviet Union's objectives? How did the Soviet Union intervene in the revolution?

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[188] "Soviet Involvement in the Iranian Crisis", CIA Report (14), 2/12/79. Omitted. Dcls N.D. Incomplete. 002499.

The Soviet Union's Policy toward the Pre-revolutionary State

According to U.S. Intelligence sources, the Soviets had a two-tracked policy of "noncommittal official stand" and "sympathy and support for the opposition" regarding the Shah's regime:

> In the fall of 1978...the Soviets adopted an essentially two-tracked policy designed to preserve all their options in the face of developments that were moving autonomously toward the overthrow of the Shah. On the one hand, they took a cautious, noncommittal official stand, both publicly and privately, with respect to the internal Iranian situation. By so doing, they hoped to preserve their relations with the Iranian regime if it survived and to avoid Western action. At the same time, they tried to convey sympathy and support for the opposition in Iran, including that led by ...Khomeini, and to encourage those opposition elements like the Tudeh Party that are close to them.[189]

Soviet Goals and the Revolution

The Soviet Union intervened in the Iranian Revolution to overthrow the Shah's regime in order to destroy the U.S.-Iran alliance, to bring about the coming to power of a regime which would be responsive to the Soviet Union, and to dominate the Persian Gulf region.

The Soviet Union had:

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[189] Ibid, "Key Judgments".

A basic desire to see the Shah replaced by a more responsive regime in Iran and a complementary drive to undercut the US position there...[190]

Despite the official Iran-USSR relations,

The Soviets continued to view the Shah as a conservative, anti-Soviet leader who had worked hard and successfully to limit Soviet advancement in the Persian Gulf region. They undoubtedly preferred establishment of a regime more responsive to their interests or a weakening of the Shah which would in turn limit Iran's ability to play an active anti-Soviet role in affairs of the region.[191]

How did the Soviet Union Intervene in the Iranian Revolution?

The Soviet Union intervened in the Iranian Revolution by utilizing what the report terms as "The Tools of Soviet Action" against the Shah's regime. This report has classified these means in seven categories:

While pursuing their policy of reconciliation with the Shah during the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets retained all the various tools available for use against him. These included critical public and private statements; support for a clandestine radio station broadcasting into Iran; continuing ties to the Tudeh Communist Party, which has its own long history of subversion in Iran; a continuing espionage network within Iran; implicit approval for the training of Iranian dissidents by other forces hostile to the Shah; the capability to conduct cross-border infiltration and arms deliveries in support of the anti-Shah movement; and of course, a military capability on the Iranian border.[192]

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[190] Ibid, "Key Judgments".
[191] Ibid, p.1.
[192] Ibid, p.2

The report examines all of the above, apparently with the non-disclosure of the last category. This chapter analyzes two of the above, as classified by the report: 1) Open Commentaries, and 2) Clandestine Radio Broadcasts (although reference to the fifth and sixth categories will be made towards the end of this chapter). Both categories are related to Soviet communication, more specifically the Soviet media.

A. Open Commentaries in the Soviet Media

The Soviet open commentaries were propaganda against the United States, against the Shah's regime including its foreign policies, and against the U.S.-Iran alliance. In the late 1970s, the Soviets

> ...publicly expressed their displeasure with a number of the Shah's policies. They...criticized Iran's acquisition of large quantities of Western arms and its close military ties to the United States. They...attacked the shah's alleged desire to act as the 'policeman' of the Gulf and were particularly unhappy with Iran's decisive intervention on behalf of the Sultan of Oman in the mid-1970s against the Soviet-backed Dhofari insurgency.[193]

In the context of Iran's domestic affairs, the Soviet critical commentaries attacked the Shah's regime and supported the opposition to his regime:

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[193] Ibid,p.2.

As the Shah's position became precarious, the Soviets revised their estimate of his prospects, and their commentaries became increasingly critical of his government and sympathetic to opposition charges. Media comments emphasized underlying social and economic problems, citing opposition leaders' statements, and criticized the 'repressive' actions of SAVAK.[194]

B. Clandestine Radiobroadcasts: The "National" Voice of Iran

One of the Soviet Union's most direct interventions in the Iranian revolution was the establishment and the broadcast of a radio station beamed into Iran. The radio was named the National Voice of Iran. Since it broadcast in Persian, and since the Soviets disguised its affiliation with the Soviet Union, it might have had a considerable audience, and an impact in intensifying discontent and in mobilizing the revolutionaries and would-be revolutionaries.

The report thus indicates the clandestine nature of the National Voice of Iran:

> Since 1959, the Soviet Union has supported the National Voice of Iran, a Persian-language Communist clandestine radio station broadcasting from Baku in the Soviet Transcaucasus. National Voice presents itself as Iranian, although it occasionally praises the attitude of the USSR, and it has never been officially identified with Tudeh or any other Iranian grouping.[195]

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[194] Ibid.
[195] Ibid, p.6.

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The airtime schedule was as follows: the radio broadcast its programs "for 45 minutes every evening in Persian and Azerbaijani, [and] extended its schedule by half an hour in late January."[196]

From the beginning, the "National" Voice "issued venomous propaganda attacks against the Shah personally..."[197], against Iran's ties with the United States and the Western alliance, and, "there were occasionally calls in the late 1960s for the overthrow of the Shah".[198] "Themes during this period included demands for expulsion of US military advisers and withdrawing from CENTO...[and] criticism of various government social and economic policies...." [199]

In the period of the revolutionary situation, the Soviet-sponsored National Voice of Iran directly intervened against the Shah's regime and in support of the revolution:

> [In] fall [1978] National Voice broadcasts essentially updated and intensified previous commentaries...the tone became sharper and more strident as the situation within Iran deteriorated. Commentary in November and December charged that the regime was 'under the control of American advisers and military' and called for a decisive struggle, using all forms of struggle, to oust the regime. This line paralleled the prevailing public Soviet line—but at a far more virulent and activist level."[200]

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[196] Ibid.
[197] Ibid.
[198] Ibid.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Ibid, pp.6-7.

The content of the propaganda broadcasts is documented in the report:

> National Voice denounced the regime as despotic, bloodthirsty, criminal, and decadent and condemned it for the 'brutal torture' and murder of unarmed people.[201]

One direct type of intervention concerned the call for revolutionary activities, and guidance regarding revolutionary strategies against the Shah's regime. The report documents that the Soviet-sponsored "National" Voice of Iran:

> ...called on workers to participate in general strikes, advised soldiers to lay down their arms and support those struggling for liberty, and urged people in general to use all forms of struggle to overthrow the 'despotic regime'.[202]

Support of Arab States and Palestinian Organizations' intervention in the revolution

The fifth and sixth categories of Soviet involvement in the Iranian revolution documented in the report, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, are: "implicit approval for the training of Iranian dissidents by other forces hostile to the Shah; [and] "the capability to conduct cross-

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[201] Ibid, p.7.
[202] Ibid.

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border infiltration and arms deliveries in support of the anti-Shah movement".[203]

The report is skeptical that two of the main revolutionary groups (Islamic-"Marxist" Mojahadin-i-Khalq and Marxist-Leninist Fidayan-i-Khalq) had a "direct connection...with the Soviet Union", but it does indicate that "the groups ha[d] probably received financial assistance and training from both Libya and the Palestine Liberation organization (PLO) which in turn ha[d] received equipments and training from the USSR".[204]

Summary

The Soviet Union's intervention in the Iranian Revolution falls under the third category of revolutionary intervention: it weakened the pre-revolutionary state, and it reinforced the domestic forces. It weakened the pre-revolutionary state by damaging the credibility of the Shah's regime via the broadcast of critical commentaries and attacks on the Shah and his regime through open commentaries in the Soviet media and the clandestine Soviet-sponsored National Voice of Iran radio broadcasts.

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[203] Ibid, p.2.
[204] Ibid, p.9.

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The Soviet Union reinforced the domestic forces in two respects. First, it intensified discontent, mobilized the opposition, and provided revolutionary guidance and revolutionary strategy via the broadcasts of its radio, The National Voice of Iran, broadcast in Persian and disguised as an Iranian medium. Second, it provided financial and military support to the radical Arab states and the Palestinian organizations that intervened in support of the domestic forces.

The conclusion that may be drawn from the declassified documents analyzed in this chapter is that the Soviet Union's intervention against the old regime and in support of the Iranian domestic forces was an intervention which took place in the context of the bipolar international system. The Soviet Union's intervention was directed at the Middle East subsystem but was essentially a policy implemented in the context of the international politics and the conflicts of the larger international system between the bipolar actors. The political developments in Iran, specifically the crisis of the revolutionary situation, and the Soviet Union's influence in the revolution (including the open attack commentaries in the Soviet Media, the subversive propaganda of the Soviet-sponsored clandestine radio broadcasts of the "National" Voice of Iran, and the support of the radical Arab states and Palestinian organizations' intervention in the revolution) were exerted due to the Soviet Union's rivalry with the United States in the political-

economy of the Middle East subsystem. It was initiated and implemented to destroy the U.S.-Iran alliance in the Cold War, and to eliminate the Shah's regime which sought to and succeeded (with the alliance with the United States and U.S.-allied regional actors) in preventing Soviet expansionism in the region in order to maintain the security and stability of the region.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

I. International Factors in Revolution

Theories of Revolution: An Integration

Endogenous Theories of Revolution

Theorists of revolution who have analyzed the causes of revolution in a domestic context have contributed to the study of the causes of revolution. These theorists have illuminated many aspects of revolutionary processes and causes of revolution. These include social disequilibrium (Johnson), repressed instincts of various types (Sorokin), rising expectations in tolerable but declining socio-economic circumstances (Davies), and relative deprivation and organizational superiority of the revolutionaries including the revolutionizing of the neutral populace (Gurr).

The weakness of these theories is in limiting levels of analysis to the individual and society. To determine the causes of revolution, we need to broaden our level of analysis to the state, and even to a level higher, that of the international system. Subsequent theorists have contributed to the study of revolutions by analyzing revolution from a

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state/society level of analysis while also contributing to the study of the state/international system level of analysis and exogenous factors in revolutions.

Endogenous/Exogenous Theories of Revolution

Extant theories of revolution which consider both exogenous and endogenous factors in revolution have contributed to our understanding of revolution. Causal factors in revolution include the international system: military competition and imperialism, uneven economic development, international crises in part causing the breakdown of states, and state breakdown preceding revolutionary movements (Skocpol), lack of support by a superpower in the process of revolution and international intervention as deepening or furthering the revolutionary process (Goldfrank), unequal political status and economic development (Bailey), the political-psychology aspect of the decision-making process of superpowers in responding to revolutions (Cottam), the political system of the pre-revolutionary state as a vulnerability which is exacerbated by U.S. policy (Goldstone), and transnational ideology and examples, and exogenous assistance or "input" into the growth of revolutionary movements (Halliday).

There are three general deficiencies in the existing literature on exogenous factors in revolution. First, all theorize exclusively about the

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international state system. However, both states and non-state actors may be causal factors in revolution.

Intergovernmental organizations have an impact on revolutions. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have been causal factors in at least two revolutions in the twentieth century. Jack A. Goldstone has referred to the impact of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the Nicaraguan Revolution. Goldstone writes: "The Somoza's rule came to an end in 1979 as a consequence of international pressures, elite opposition, and popular revolts. International pressures came from the United States, which under President Carter's human rights policy, forced Somoza to ease repression aimed at his opponents, and from the International Monetary Fund, which forced Somoza to devalue Nicaragua's currency and institute economic reforms."[205]

IFI's, in particular the IMF's impact on revolution, is due to the impact of two factors: the IMF conditionality agreements, and the IMF structural adjustment program. In the Philippines Revolution (1986), the latter two, specifically the devaluation of currency, tax increases, imposition of new taxes and tightening of domestic credit in part contributed to unemployment, inflation, and socio-political unrest,

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[205] Jack A. Goldstone, ed., Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies, Second Edition, p.147.

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supplemented with domestic factors contributing to the occurrence of the revolution.[206]

Second, in analyzing the international state system, only superpowers are considered as factors in revolution. The subsystems/regional powers may also have an impact on revolution.

Third, the theories account for exogenous factors as having an impact on a revolution once the pre-revolutionary state undergoes a revolution. Skocpol's theory is an exception (and Halliday's theory). Skocpol argues that international factors undermine the state because it affects the political authority (which she defines as administrative and coercive organizations) of the pre-revolutionary state. This is significant because international factors weaken the state, and contribute to the emergence of revolutionary crises.

International Factors in Revolution

Polarity, polar actors, the sub-system regional actors, alliances, and intervention by both state actors and non-state actors may have an impact on the success or failure of a revolution. Polarity determines the "interaction opportunity" open to the pre-revolutionary state including alliances at the system and sub-system levels.

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[206] On the political-economy of the Philippines, refer to Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., "The Marcos Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt in the Philippines" in Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins, Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 3, Country Studies-Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago, 1989), pp. 371-614.

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Alliances at the system level as well as alliances at the subsystem level may contribute to the success or failure of revolution. Actors at both levels may exert influence on revolution including through intervention.

There are three types of revolutionary intervention: 1) directly weakening the state, 2) directly reinforcing the opposition, and 3) directly weakening the state and indirectly reinforcing the opposition. The sovereignty of the pre-revolutionary state including its domestic jurisdiction may be undermined by international intervention. Humanitarian international intervention is justified. International intervention for democracy is controversial, but justified. But the justifiability of international intervention to change the foreign policy of a state which respects and observes the norms and principles of international law is questionable.

Both state actors and non-state actors may have an influence on revolution. At the system level, polar actors may be contributory factors in revolution. The polar actors may intervene directly or indirectly to weaken the pre-revolutionary state and/or to reinforce the revolutionaries. Polar actors also may influence revolutions through their direct or indirect influence with their regional allies in the subsystem in which the pre-revolutionary state is located.

At the subsystem level, the regional actors, whether with or without the assistance of their polar allies, may also contribute to the success of revolution.

Non-state actors may also exert influence on revolution. For example, International Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) such as International Financial Institutions have been causal factors in revolution. The IMF's impact on revolution is due to the impact of the IMF conditionality agreements and the IMF structural adjustment program. The implementation of these policies by the state borrower may contribute to sociopolitical unrest and revolution.

The Causes of the Iranian Revolution

The causes of the Iranian Revolution are international factors, domestic factors, and state responsiveness.

I.   International Factors

Conspiracy theories regarding the Iranian Revolution which many Iranians and non-Iranians believe have blocked the study of international factors in the Iranian Revolution. It has been argued here that there were strong internal forces, possibly even decisive internal forces, but that there were also external forces. But the extremism

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associated with the conspiracy theory has impeded the scholarly study of the external influences on the revolutionary process.

International influences in revolution may include state actors and non-state actors. The former requires an analysis of the international state system. The latter requires an analysis of the international system. Extant theories of revolution have made a contribution to the study of the international state system and revolutions—more specifically on superpowers and revolution: military competition and imperialism of the more advanced capitalist powers weakening the pre-revolutionary state (Skocpol), lack of support by a superpower and international intervention as deepening or furthering a revolutionary process (Goldfrank), and the political system of the incumbent state as having a vulnerability exacerbated by a superpower (Goldstone). [207]

Bipolar Actors and the System Level and the Iranian Revolution

The Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy, and the Shah's regime's responsiveness (Policy of Liberalization), had an impact on the

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[207] Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Walter L. Goldfrank, "Theories of Revolution and Revolution Without Theory: The Case of Mexico", Theory and Society, Volume 7, Nos. 1 and 2, January-March 1979. I found the citation and excerpts of this article in Jack A. Goldstone, Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1994); Jack A. Goldstone, "Revolution in modern Dictatorships, Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1994). For a detailed analysis of these and other theories of revolution refer to Chapter Two.

Iranian Revolution. As stated by Dr. Henry Kissinger, the concomitant statements of support by the Administration were inconsequential and the "operational content" of the Administration's policy—that is, imposing an "internal programme"—undertaken by the Shah's regime involuntarily and implemented in an untimely manner, contributed to the success of the revolution.[208]

The role of the other Cold War polar actor, the Soviet Union, and its intervention in the Iranian Revolution falls under the third category of revolutionary intervention: it weakened the pre-revolutionary state, and it reinforced the domestic forces. It weakened the pre-revolutionary state by damaging the credibility of the Shah's regime via the broadcast of critical commentaries and attacks on the Shah and his regime through open commentaries in the Soviet media and the clandestine Soviet-sponsored National Voice of Iran radio broadcasts.

The Soviet Union reinforced the domestic forces in two respects. First, it intensified discontent, mobilized the opposition, and provided revolutionary guidance and revolutionary strategy via the broadcasts of its radio, The National Voice of Iran, broadcast in Persian and disguised as an Iranian medium. Second, it provided financial and military support to the radical Arab states and the Palestinian organizations that intervened in support of the domestic forces.

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[208] Henry Kissinger's interview with The Economist,, "Kissinger's Critique" p.32.

The conclusion that may be drawn from the declassified documents analyzed in Chapter Five is that the Soviet Union's intervention against the old regime and in support of the Iranian domestic forces was an intervention which took place in the context of the bipolar international system. The Soviet Union's intervention was directed at the Middle East subsystem but was essentially a policy implemented in the context of international politics and the conflicts of the larger international system, between the bipolar actors. The political developments in Iran—the crisis of the revolutionary situation—and the Soviet Union's influence in the revolution (including the open attack commentaries in the Soviet Media, the subversive propaganda of the Soviet-sponsored clandestine radio broadcasts of the "National" Voice of Iran, and the support of the radical Arab states and Palestinian organizations' intervention in the revolution), was exerted due to the Soviet Union's rivalry with the United States in the political-economy of the Middle East subsystem. It was initiated and implemented to destroy the U.S.-Iran alliance in the Cold War, and to eliminate the Shah's regime which sought to and succeeded (with the alliance with the United States and regional actors) in preventing Soviet expansionism in the region in order to maintain the security and stability of the region.

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II. Domestic Factors

Theories of revolution which emphasize domestic factors theorize about domestic factors which cause revolutions: repressed instincts (Sorokin)[209], social disequilibrium (Johnson)[210], rising expectations in tolerable but declining socio-economic circumstances (Davies)[211], and relative deprivation and the organizational superiority of the revolutionaries including the revolutionizing of the neutral populace (Gurr)[212].

Domestic factors including the capabilities of the domestic forces are significant. Yet, the domestic causes of revolution may not be sufficient causes of revolution. The domestic factors may not independently cause revolution. In the Iranian Revolution, it was the interaction of international factors and domestic factors which brought about the revolution.

Domestic Forces (The Revolutionaries)

Opposition to the Shah's regime existed in Iran at least since the fall of Mossadegh's administration, and the revolutionaries had a role to play in the revolution. They engaged in strikes, they demonstrated in the

[209] Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Sociology of Revolution (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1925).
[210] Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Second Edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
[211] James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution" in American Sociological Review, Volume 27, Number 1, February 1962.
[212] Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

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streets, engaged in violence, were organized, mobilized against the regime, and presented a united front against the old regime. Without this human agency in the revolution, there would not have been a revolution from below in Iran in 1978-1979.

III. State Responsiveness

Endogenous theories of revolution have accounted for the causes of revolution as having Elite Response as a variable. Pitirim Sorokin's theory indicates that elite response is a determinative factor in revolution: increasing repression will result in revolution, and decreasing repression contributes to the failure of a revolution.[213] Chalmers Johnson's theory holds that "Elite Intransigence" (defined as the implementation of policies which are reactionary in that they exacerbate the social disequilibrium) contributes to the success of revolution, while "conservative change" contributes to the "resynchronization" of the social system without the occurrence of a revolution.

Sorokin and Johnson analyze elite response to domestic situations. Elite response may be generalized as the pre-revolutionary state's response. It can be argued that the state's response is not limited to the

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[213] Refer to the diagram in A.S. Cohan, Theories of Revolution: An Introduction. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), p.193.

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domestic environment, but rather it includes the state's response to the international environment.

In the Iranian Revolution, the pre-revolutionary state's response to the liberal domestic forces and the international environment regarding the lack of political development was the implementation of the Policy of Political Liberalization, an important factor in the causes of the revolution.

The Collapse of the State

Theda Skocpol's theory of revolution holds that international pressures weaken the pre-revolutionary state, and that the state breaks down in part due to international pressures. It is argued here that in the Iranian Revolution, as in the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, international factors weakened the Shah's regime. The conclusion reached here is that international factors caused the collapse of the state in two respects: 1) intervention, and 2) lack of support by the international state system. One example of the latter is the Carter Administration's Human Rights Policy and the debate in the Administration, which as Chapter Four has indicated had an impact on the political leadership of the old regime. The channels of communication between the two states was not clear. There was a paralysis of the state.

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The Soviet Union's intervention against the old regime and in support of the revolutionaries, the Carter Administration's and the European community's lack of support, and the lack of support by regional allies, left the ancien régime without allies both regionally and globally. Faced with international and domestic pressure, international intervention, and lack of support by other states in the international system, the regime collapsed.

The Behavior of State Actors

Intervention?

As discussed in Chapter Three, Rosenau's definition of intervention indicates two components of any intervention: 1) convention-breaking, and 2) authority oriented. He stresses that both must be present.[214]

This dissertation analyzed the interactions of the old regime and the revolutionaries, and a number of players in the international system. Both bipolar actors at the system level and the Middle East system were discussed. Did these actors intervene in the Iranian Revolution?

Applying Rosenau's criteria of intervention, which is perhaps addressed to the behavior of the international state system, has

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[214] James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume XIII, Number 2, June 1969, p.161.

produced the following results. The interventionary behavior of the state actors follows:

A preliminary application of the above theory indicates that the Carter Administration did not intervene in the Iranian revolution because its relations with the old regime did not meet any of the criteria. Its relations with the Shah's regime, even though there was a call for implementation of reforms, was interpreted by the Shah's regime and the revolutionaries as convention-breaking. Iranians saw a sharp break in bilateral relations, but no policy change regarding the regime was made by the Carter Administration. Furthermore, it was not authority-oriented because there was a debate in the Carter Administration regarding Iran during the revolution, and the Administration had no policy regarding the revolution neither as changing nor preserving the structure of political authority of the Shah's regime. Yet this application of intervention theory does not fully explain the policy of the Carter Administration's toward the Shah's regime. There were in fact two policies, one called for the changing of the old regime; the other for the preservation of the old regime. In its proper historical context, the context of the bilateral U.S.-Iran relations since the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, since Iran was in the United States' sphere of influence in the Cold War system, the Carter Administration intervened in the Iranian Revolution by not intervening.

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The Soviet Union's relations regarding the old regime met both criteria. It was convention-breaking because Iran had normalized its relations with the Soviet Union, but this was followed with Soviet open commentaries and clandestine radio broadcasts in opposition to the regime. It was authority oriented because the Soviet Union through its clandestine radio broadcasts, the National Voice of Iran, sought to change/overthrow the Shah's regime.

Loyalty or Prudence?

The Shah and the loyal political elite felt betrayed by the international state system's lack of support and calculation of their policies toward the regime on the factor of whether the regime will last, but loyalty is the exception rather than the norm in international relations, rather, each state acts according to its own national interests in the anarchic international system.

This issue may be analyzed in the context of the paradigmatic developments in the theories of international relations. Prior to the Second World War, the paradigm of Idealism stressed morality in international relations. Subsequent to WWII, the paradigm of political Realism with its leading theorist, Hans Morgenthau, stressed prudence and the national interest in international relations.

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The lack of support of state actors in the international system vis-à-vis the old regime concerned the element of rationality in the Realist paradigm which holds that states behave 1) as rational actors, 2) to advance the national interest, and 3) according to cost-benefit analysis.

Recommendations on the Study of Revolution

Crane Brinton in his classic study of revolution applied the scientific method to the study of revolution. He introduced a new approach, and introduced us to a new method and philosophy in the search for the study of revolutions. Since then, scholars in their respective disciplines have analyzed revolutions within the contexts and paradigms of their disciplines. Multidisciplinary approach to the study of the social sciences and humanities has advanced our knowledge. It is appropriate to extend the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approach in the social sciences and the humanities to the study of revolution. As Brinton reminded us, no single discipline has the absolute answer to inquiries in the social sciences and the humanities. We all have our limitations. We are all searching for the causes, consequences, and the process of revolution. A multidisciplinary approach to the study of revolution can integrate and complement our research in the study of revolution—an event which has drastically affected human lives, the

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course of history, national and international society, and international relations.

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